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THE DIFFUSION OF DUE PROCESS IN CAPITAL CASES OF
ACTUAL INNOCENCE AFTER HERRERA
HENRY PIETRKOWSKI*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental uses of a federal writ of habeas
corpus' is to save a state prisoner from a scheduled execution in a
capital case.2 However, in Herrera v. Collins,3 the United States
Supreme Court held that a claim of "actual innocence," 4 which is
based only on newly discovered evidence, is not a ground for federal
habeas relief in a capital case absent meeting an "extraordinarily
high" threshold of evidence presentation.5 This decision bodes ill for
the right to seek habeas relief for those convicts who have a substan-
tive actual innocence claim but no procedural error to accompany it.
Because this post-conviction relief was all but denied in Herrera,6
the Supreme Court found it necessary to offer executive clemency as
an alternative to habeas review, holding clemency out as "the historic
remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where [the] judicial pro-
cess has been exhausted."17 Thus, in the same breath, the Court in
Herrera closed off an entire avenue of habeas review while replacing it
* B.A. 1992, Northwestern University; J.D. 1995, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology. I wish to thank Professor Margaret Stewart, Noreen Connolly, and
Clarke M. Gillespie III for their valuable contributions to the creation of this Note.
1. A habeas corpus petition is the principal historical means by which a state prisoner may
petition the federal courts for relief on the ground that the state has violated his or her constitu-
tional rights. The writ may only be employed as a final resort once the imprisoned individual has
exhausted all available state remedies. See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF §§ 8-2, 8-15 (2d ed. 1987).
2. The primary restraint on execution in the United States during the 1980s was the federal
court system. Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punish-
ment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 13 (1992).
3. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
4. For purposes of this Note, an "actual innocence" claim denotes a claim of factual inno-
cence of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted, without any accompanying procedural
error.
5. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. Herrera was the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court had
the occasion to address a claim of actual innocence without any accompanying procedural error.
6. The right to habeas review of a free-standing actual innocence claim was not absolutely
denied by the Court in Herrera, but the "extraordinarily high" threshold that the Court set out
for hearing such a claim on the merits makes habeas review highly unlikely. Id.
7. Id at 866.
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with executive clemency as the main procedural safeguard in death
row claims of actual innocence.8
The Texas case of death row inmate Gary Graham 9 is one of the
first state cases after Herrera to put the clemency alternative to the
test. In that case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals10 stayed Gra-
ham's scheduled execution in order to consider whether, in light of
Herrera, Graham had a constitutional due process right to invoke the
clemency process even though the Texas clemency statute does not
provide such a right." But rather than rule on the clemency issue, the
court in Graham actually created a new state habeas procedure so that
the petitioner's actual innocence claim could be heard. 12 The Graham
case is only one example of how Herrera's replacement of habeas re-
view with clemency as the "fail safe" remedy for claims of actual inno-
cence 13 has shifted the responsibility of ensuring due process in capital
cases from the federal forum to the executive branch and state courts.
This Note explores how the Supreme Court's decision in Herrera
has diffused responsibility for ensuring due process in actual inno-
cence claims among alternative forums and whether such relinquish-
ment of the federal habeas power is appropriate.' 4 Part I presents an
overview of the role of actual innocence claims in the Supreme
Court's habeas jurisprudence. Part II deals with executive clemency
and is divided into three sections that correspond to the three underly-
ing theories of the clemency power as a (A) "mercy-based" process;
(B) "justice-enhancing" process; and (C) "entitlement" under the Due
Process Clause.
Part III presents the facts and holdings of the Gary Graham case.
Part IV uses the Graham case to offer an analysis of how the Herrera
8. Id. at 866-68.
9. There are actually six opinions in the Graham case covered by this Note: Ex parte Gra-
ham, 853 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993); Ex
parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane); State ex rel. Holmes v. Third
Court of Appeals of Texas, 860 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en bane); State ex rel.
Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993) (en bane); State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en bane); Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles v. Graham, 878
S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). See Part III infra.
10. This is the same court that had heard Herrera's case before it was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
11. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d at 873-75.
12. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 398-99.
13. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
14. Advocates of the death penalty should understand that this Note does not take any
stance on the constitutionality or morality of the death penalty itself. It is the wrongful execu-
tion of innocent persons that is the true focus of this Note, regardless of the political agendas
that underlie either side of the death penalty debate. See infra note 359.
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decision has shifted responsibility for due process in capital cases of
actual innocence to alternative forums. Section (A) discusses whatminimal due process protections should be due in cases of actual inno-
cence. The next three sections use this due process framework in or-
der to analyze the shifts from: (B) federal habeas to the executive
branch; (C) federal habeas to state habeas review; and (D) these alter-
native forums back to the federal judicial forum. The Note concludes
that the Supreme Court must reassert its jurisdiction over such claims
in order to prevent the further diffusion of due process in this area.
I. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AND THE HABEAS PROCESS
Though the problem of convictions of innocent persons is an im-
portant one in our criminal justice system,15 the nineteenth century
black letter rule stated that claims of newly discovered evidence of
actual innocence were not grounds for postconviction relief.16 This
rule originated because of the natural reluctance of courts to permit
collateral remedies to be used merely to relitigate the general issue of
guilt or innocence decided in the original criminal proceeding. 17 As a
result of this mind set, the writ of habeas corpus' 8 has historically been
predicated upon constitutional violations of procedural due process
rather than any substantive claim of actual innocence.' 9 Particularly
in regard to death penalty jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
adopted an essentially process-oriented approach toward habeas re-
view.20 As far back as the early 1960s, the Supreme Court held that a
claim of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence was not cogni-
15. See WILKES, supra note 1, 1-13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The writ is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Article I, § 9, and by state
constitutions. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.
19. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86,87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.) ("[W]hat we have to
deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question
whether their constitutional right[s] have been preserved."); In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888)
("As the writ of habeas corpus does not perform the office of a writ of error or an appeal, [the
facts establishing guilt] cannot be re-examined or reviewed in this collateral proceeding.").
20. Stephen Garvey has expounded two rationales for the Court's decision to restrict the
scope of federal habeas review: comity and finality. Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and
the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALB. L. REV. 225, 259 (1992) [hereinafter Garvey, Death-Inno-
cence]. Under the comity rationale, the Supreme Court wants to afford respect to state court
decisions by not reviewing them absent some procedural error of constitutional dimensions. Id.
This rationale also produces efficient results as state convictions need not be relitigated in fed-
eral or state forums. Id. The Court also wishes to finalize criminal convictions in order to pro-
mote general deterrence and repose among the public. Id. at 260. The finality concern also
takes into account the money saved in not having to relitigate old state convictions.
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zable in a federal habeas proceeding absent some procedural error
that bears "upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention."'21
In the 1970s, the Court desired to cut back upon the broad habeas
review allowed by its previous decisions.22 It was this restriction of its
broad habeas jurisprudence that prompted the Court to once again
concentrate upon the idea of actual innocence. In Stone v. Powell,
23
the Court held that federal habeas review should be limited to consti-
tutional claims that relate to the actual guilt or innocence of the peti-
tioner.24 In Stone, the petitioner brought a procedural habeas claim
under the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.25 The Court refused to
hear the petitioner's claim on the merits, holding that the Mapp rule
served only a deterrent purpose,26 but it did not bear upon the peti-
tioner's actual innocence or the basic justice of his incarceration. 27
However, subsequent cases proved that the holding in Stone was not
so narrow as to limit habeas review to only those matters relating to
the petitioner's actual guilt or innocence, but to other constitutional
claims as well.28
Likewise, a series of cases beginning in the late 1970s, in which
the Court restricted procedural habeas review, also caused the Court
to focus on the idea of actual innocence. 29 The Court accomplished
21. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), overruled in other respects by Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992). In fact, the Supreme Court has been consistent in holding
that actual innocence is sometimes a necessary, but never a sufficient, condition for a grant of
habeas relief. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay On the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems With Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J.
817, 819 (1993) [hereinafter Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?].
22. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953) (allowing habeas review for claims
already fully and fairly litigated).
23. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
24. Prior to this case, the purpose of habeas review had never been posed in terms of fac-
tual, rather than legal, innocence.
25. Stone, 428 U.S. at 474. The rule provides that property secured through an illegal search
or seizure conducted by state police may not be used at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
26. Stone, 428 U.S. at 491. The rule. presumably deters state police from performing an
illegal search and seizure of the defendant's property.
27. Id. at 491 n.30 & 31. In fact, the Court held that the physical evidence sought to be
excluded by the Mapp rule is "typically reliable and often the most probative information bear-
ing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id. at 490.
28. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (holding that Sixth Amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriate for habeas review); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979) (holding that racially discriminatory grand jury is appropriate for habeas
review).
29. This line of cases began with the Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), in which the Court held that habeas petitioners are subject to valid state procedural bars
arising from the strategic decisions or oversights of defense lawyers in failing to present claims
for resolution by state courts. See Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21.
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these restrictions by imposing the exhaustion,30 successive petition,31
procedural default32 and abuse of the writ33 doctrines, as well as
prohibiting the retroactive application of "new" constitutional rules to
habeas petitioners under the Teague analysis. 34 These doctrines
greatly restricted the ability of state prisoners to successfully petition
for federal habeas review on procedural grounds. 35
In order to reduce the harshness of these restrictive doctrines, the
Court decided to provide exceptions for substantive actual innocence
claims. For instance, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,36 the Court created an
exception for presenting successive habeas claims where the petitioner
could make "a colorable showing of factual innocence. ' 37 Likewise,
in Murray v. Carrier,38 the Court held that procedurally defaulted
claims could be brought where a "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
has occurred and the constitutional violation has "probably resulted"
in a mistaken conviction. Similarly, the case of McCleskey v. Zant,39
which established the abuse of the writ doctrine, also mentioned an
exception for "extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation
probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime."
Even Teague v. Lane4° provides an exception for claims of "funda-
30. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). This doctrine requires the defendant to exhaust all
of his or her state remedies before attempting to obtain federal habeas review.
31. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). A "successive petition" raises grounds identi-
cal to those raised and rejected on the merits in a prior petition. The Court wished to restrict
any habeas petition that had already been rejected by a previous court and that alleged no new
grounds in its second claim. Id. at 454.
32. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
33. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). This doctrine restricts bringing any claim on
habeas that could have been but was not raised in a prior habeas petition. Id. at 493.
34. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), the Court held that "new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced." The rule has had a very restrictive effect on habeas claims and
has been justified as producing "finality" in the litigation process. Id. at 308-09.
35. Zimring remarks that at one level, the debate about habeas corpus can be seen as a
power struggle between capital defendants and the Supreme Court Justices for control of federal
court dockets. It was the potential of multiple habeas procedures to take agenda-setting power
out of the hands of the Justices that particularly bothered the Supreme Court and forced it to
create these procedural bars to habeas review. See Zimring, supra note 2, at 14.
36. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
37. Id. at 454. The Court adopted this standard from a law review article: Henry J. Friendly,
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CI-. L. REV. 142, 160
(1970). According to Judge Friendly's standard, the prisoner must "show a fair probability that,
in light of all the evidence.., the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of
his guilt." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 n.17 (citing Friendly, supra).
38. 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
39. 499 U.S. 467 (1991). The Court equated the actual innocence exception with the "fun-
damental miscarriage of justice exception" set out in Carrier. Id. at 493 (citing Carrier, 477 U.S.
at 485).
40. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496; and
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976)).
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mental fairness" that concern "the likely accuracy of convictions. ''41
Thus, it was the harshness of the Court's restrictive doctrines on pro-
cedural habeas review that ultimately prompted the substantive merits
of the petitioner's actual innocence claim to reappear in federal
habeas jurisprudence.4 2
In Sawyer v. Whitley,43 the Court explicitly set the standard for
determining whether a petitioner bringing a successive, abusive, or de-
faulted federal habeas claim concerning a capital sentencing proceed-
ing has shown that he is "actually innocent of the death penalty" for
purposes of avoiding the procedural bar and reaching the merits. 4
The Court required "clear and convincing evidence that but for a con-
stitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law."'45
In Schiup v. Del'o, 6 the Court explicitly limited the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard in Sawyer to claims of actual innocence
that challenge a constitutional error during the sentencing phase of
the trial, but retained the "probably actually innocent" standard of
Carrier for reaching the merits of claims which challenge the peti-
tioner's underlying conviction. The Court reasoned:
Claims of actual innocence pose less of a threat to scarce judicial
resources and to principles of finality and comity than do claims that
41. Id. at 312-13. But see Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence,
18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415, 427 (1990-91) (contending that the second exception in
Teague affords no special protection to the actually innocent defendant).
42. See Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21, at 827.
43. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
44. The Court set out three possible ways in which actual innocence might be defined in the
context of a capital sentencing proceeding. It. at 2521. The strictest definition would be to limit
any showing to negating an essential element of the offense charged. The most lenient definition
would concern the "ultimate discretionary decision between the death penalty and life imprison-
ment" including all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. The third approach takes
the middle ground that the showing must bear upon the objective factors or conditions relevant
to the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. Such an approach does not consider mitigat-
ing evidence which was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional
error. Id. at 2523. The Court adopted this last approach in formulating its standard. Id.
45. Id. The Court explained its use of the clear and convincing evidence standard by stat-
ing, "If federal habeas review of capital sentences is to be at all rational, petitioner must show
something more in order for a court to reach the merits of his claims on a successive habeas
petition than he would have had to show to obtain relief on his first habeas petition [meeting the
'cause and prejudice' standard]." Id. at 2522. The Court also held that the petitioner's standard
"would so broaden the inquiry as to make it anything but a 'narrow' exception to the principle of
finality." Id. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor,
took issue with the "clear and convincing" evidence standard of the majority and suggested
instead a standard of "probable actual innocence" or "clearly erroneous" to determine whether
the defendant had met the threshold for hearing the habeas claim on the merits. ld. at 2530
(Stevens, J., concurring).
46. 115 S. Ct. 851, 865 (1995).
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focus solely on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty 47 ....
Of greater importance, the individual interest in avoiding injustice is
most compelling in the context of actual innocence. The quintes-
sential miscarriage of justice is the execution of a person who is en-
tirely innocent.
4 8
Thus, the Court found that the importance of the greater interest in
actual innocence merited the imposition of a "somewhat less exacting
standard of proof' than in a case where the petitioner is concededly
guilty but is merely challenging the severity of his or her sentence.
49
The Court also went on to define the "probable innocence" standard
in Carrier as requiring the petitioner to show that "it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the
light of the new evidence." 50
In Herrera v. Collins,51 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
relegate substantive actual innocence claims from the backburner of
constitutional jurisprudence to the forefront. Herrera presented to
the Court for the first time the issue of whether a convicted death row
inmate could petition for habeas relief by relying solely upon a claim
of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence without any
accompanying procedural violation.52 On the basis of proof that in-
cluded two eyewitness identifications, numerous pieces of circumstan-
tial evidence, and Herrera's handwritten letter impliedly admitting his
guilt, Herrera was convicted of the murder of a police officer and sen-
tenced to death in January 1982.53 Herrera unsuccessfully challenged
his conviction on direct appeal, in two state habeas petitions to the
47. The Court rationalized, "Though challenges to the propriety of imposing a sentence of
death are routinely asserted in capital cases, experience has taught us that a substantial claim
that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare." Id
at 853.
48. Id at 866.
49. Id
50. ld at 857. According to the Court, such a standard is higher than a showing of mere
"prejudice" under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), but imposes a lower bur-
den of proof than the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of Sawyer. Id.
51. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). In fact, some legal scholars believed the Court in Herrera would
take that next step and allow a freestanding claim of actual innocence to be heard on the merits.
See, e.g., Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21, at 832-33.
52. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859. The Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), had
considered on habeas review the case of a defendant's actual innocence claim. In Jackson, the
Court found that based upon the evidence in the trial court record, no rational trier of fact could
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324. However, the Jackson holding
only provides a very narrow precedent for actual innocence claims because it involved only the
review of evidence already in the trial record. li It was not until Herrera that the Court was
able to decide a case of actual innocence involving newly discovered evidence obtained after the
completion of the trial below. 113 S. Ct. at 853.
53. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857. In July 1982, Herrera pled guilty to the capital murder of
another police officer in an earlier related incident. lM.
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Texas courts and in a federal habeas petition.5 4 Ten years after his
conviction, in February 1992, he filed a second federal habeas petition
based on a claim of actual innocence.55 He supported his claim with
affidavits tending to show that his now-dead brother had committed
both murders.5 6 Herrera argued that his actual innocence claim de-
served the protection of both the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 5
7
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court,58 refused to hear Her-
rera's petition on the basis that a claim of actual innocence, absent an
independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state
criminal proceeding, did not constitute a constitutional violation wor-
thy of federal habeas relief.59 The Court explained that this rule is
grounded in the principle that "federal habeas courts sit to ensure that
individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to
correct errors of fact."6 The Court rejected Herrera's Eighth
Amendment claims by distinguishing the cases upon which he had re-
lied,61 and then went on to dismiss his due process claims.
54. Id. at 858.
55. Id.
56. 1& Among the affidavits were those of Hector Villarreal, an attorney who had repre-
sented Herrera's brother, Raul Sr., and Juan Franco Palacious, one of Raul Sr.'s former
cellmates. Id. Both of these individuals claimed that Raul Sr., who died in 1984, had told them
that he-and not Herrera-had killed the two police officers. Id.
57. Id. at 856-57.
58. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, as did Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and White. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter dissented.
59. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), overruled in
other respects by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992)).
60. IL In support of this proposition, the court also cited to Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.) ("[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the peti-
tioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been
preserved.").
61. Herrera had argued that Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986), supported his
position that he should receive an evidentiary hearing on his claim of actual innocence because it
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of insane persons unless an eviden-
tiary hearing was held as to the person's sanity. But Justice Rehnquist distinguished Ford on the
basis that Ford had challenged his sentence while Herrera was challenging his conviction. Her-
rera, 113 S. Ct. at 863.
Likewise, Herrera cited Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), where the Court "held
that the Eighth Amendment requires reexamination of a death sentence based in part on a prior
felony conviction which was set aside... after the capital sentence was imposed." Herrera, 113
S. Ct. at 863. But Justice Rehnquist also distinguished this case by saying that in Johnson, similar
claims had previously been considered under state law by writ of error coram nobis so that there
was no need to override the state law to consider Johnson's claim on the merits. Id. at 864. By
contrast, Herrera was attempting to seek to override the law of Texas by attempting to introduce
new evidence after the thirty day limit imposed by statute, and thus could not claim protection
under the Eighth Amendment. Id
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The Court held that once a defendant has been afforded a fair
trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the pre-
sumption of innocence disappears. 62 Thus, because Herrera had al-
ready been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt in a full and fair trial
with no procedural errors, he did "not come before the Court as one
who is 'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted
by due process of law of two brutal murders. ' 63 As a result, Herrera
was not entitled to the due process protection afforded to a person
presumed "innocent." 64 The Court explained that the question was
"not whether due process prohibits the execution of an innocent per-
son, but rather whether it entitles petitioner to judicial review of his
'actual innocence' claim" and determined that "[t]his issue is properly
analyzed only in terms of procedural due process. '65 The Court con-
cluded by setting an "extraordinarily high" threshold showing for ac-
tual innocence claims as a prerequisite to reaching the merits of the
habeas petition.66
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the
result, but wrote to make it clear that she could not "disagree with the
fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent
with the Constitution. ' 67 On the matter of the threshold level for
hearing such claims, O'Connor agreed with Rehnquist that the show-
ing must be "extraordinarily high" and a "truly persuasive demonstra-
tion of 'actual innocence"' in order to avoid frivolous claims.
68
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also concurred in the re-
sult, but held that no actual innocence claim should ever be heard on
federal habeas review regardless of the persuasiveness of the evidence
presented.69 He explained, "There is no basis in text, tradition, or
even in contemporary practice ... for finding in the Constitution a
62. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 864 n.6.
65. Id. The Court also stated that "[f]ew rulings would be more disruptive of our federal
system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-standing claims of actual innocence."
Id. at 861.
66. The Court stated:
[B]ecause of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence
would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the
threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.
The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.
Id. at 869.
67. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 874.
69. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence
of innocence brought forward after conviction. '70
Justice White wrote his own concurring opinion. Rather than set-
ting the threshold level for hearing an actual innocence claim as "ex-
traordinarily high," Justice White set out a clearer standard: based on
the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury,
"no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt."'71
In a vehement dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Ste-
vens and Souter, stated that "[n]othing could be more contrary to con-
temporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience
than to execute a person who is actually innocent. '72 The dissent
found that the execution of an innocent person violates both the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 73 and
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.74 The dissent also
found the Court's decision "perverse" when viewed in light of its re-
cent habeas jurisprudence that allowed exceptions for actual inno-
cence in hearing procedurally defaulted claims.75 The dissent
proposed an alternative to the "extraordinarily high" threshold of the
majority.76 This alternative threshold would require a showing "that
there probably would be a reasonable doubt" in the jurors' minds
70. Id.
71. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
72. I& at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
73. The dissent argued that the "protection of the Eighth Amendment does not end once a
defendant has been validly convicted and sentenced." Id. at 877.
74. The dissent claimed that the majority had put "the cart before the horse" by denying
Herrera the opportunity to bring a substantive due process claim of actual innocence simply
because a previous jury without the benefit of this new evidence had found that he was not
actually innocent. Id. at 878 n.5. It explained the position of the majority as follows:
[H]aving held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution must
show he is actually innocent to obtain relief, the majority would now hold that a pris-
oner who is actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief. The
only principle that would appear to reconcile these two positions is the principle that
habeas relief should be denied whenever possible.
Id. at 880-81.
In response to this attack, Justice Rehnquist included a footnote in the majority opinion
stating that the dissent "puts the cart before the horse" by resting its due process analysis on the
assumption that the petitioner is in fact actually innocent. Id. at 864 n.6. The Court explained
that the question before it was "not whether due process prohibits the execution of an innocent
person, but rather whether it entitles petitioner to judicial review of his 'actual innocence' claim.
This issue is properly analyzed only in terms of procedural due process." Id
75. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454
(1986) (plurality opinion); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.
527, 537 (1986); and McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)).
76. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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based on the newly discovered evidence of innocence.77 The dissent
passionately concluded that the execution of a person who can show
that he is innocent "comes perilously close to simple murder. '78
In rejecting Herrera's habeas claim of actual innocence, the
Court strongly suggested that an alternative "fail safe" 79 to the judicial
process was available to him, that of the executive clemency process.8 0
The next section explores the nature of executive clemency and the
arguments made in Herrera for and against its use as a viable alterna-
tive to federal habeas review.
II. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Historically, the institution of clemency seems to have had more
to do with power than justice.81 The clemency power is a relic from
the days when an all-powerful monarch possessed the authority to re-
mit punishment as an act of mercy.82 In Biddle v. Perovich,83 the
United States Supreme Court characterized the earliest pardons as
"private act[s] of grace from an individual happening to possess
power."84
The Supreme Court has traditionally described the clemency
power as an "act of grace" 85 rather than relating it to any notions of
justice such as retribution or the "just-dessert" theory. In England,
the King used clemency in order to ensure that justice was adminis-
tered with mercy.86 However, according to Blackstone, the true pur-
pose of the King's use of the clemency power was to "endear the
sovereign to his subjects" and to achieve a favorable political atmos-
phere from his population.8 7 Thus, the decision to extend "mercy"
77. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, and McCleskey, 111 S. Ct.
at 1470).
78. Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 868.
80. Id.
81. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power From
the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 583-84 (1991) [hereinafter Kobil, Mercy Strained].
82. Id. at 575; see also Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 138 (1964) (stating history reveals that "the sovereign, whether
monarchical or other, which defines the criminal act has the power to pardon").
83. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
84. Id. at 486.
85. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (Marshall, J.).
86. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 586; J. W. EHRUcH, E-tLiCH's BLACKSTONE
963 (1959).
87. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 586; EnmucH, supra note 86, at 964.
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through clemency has historically been guided by the political
process.88
The concept of executive clemency in the United States derives
from our English heritage.8 9 Most of the colonial charters bore some
provision for the exercise of the clemency power.90 The repose of the
clemency power in the absolute discretion of state governors was al-
most uniformly the scheme provided for by state constitutions soon
after the formation of the United States.91 The twentieth century has
provided a trend toward the creation of advisory pardon boards to
either assist the governor in clemency determinations or to restrain
the governor's actions by requiring joint approval with the board in
order to grant clemency. 92
Each governor has different ideas about the function of executive
clemency, and the rate of granting clemency accordingly varies from
administration to administration,93 and from state to state.94 There
are no established standards that an executive official is bound to fol-
low in deciding whether to grant clemency, and executive officers
have expounded various grounds for their clemency decisions. 95
Among the grounds for clemency relief is that the offender's inno-
cence has been established or at least that his or her guilt is in doubt.
96
88. The "essential contention of a clemency petition is that the public interest would be
better served by sparing the life of the condemned than by taking it." Deborah Leavy, A Matter
of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889,
893 (1981).
89. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 140. Until modem times, most felonies in
Anglo-American jurisprudence were punishable not by imprisonment but by death, so that clem-
ency provided the principal opportunity for relief in capital cases. Leavy, supra note 88, at 895.
Today, "[it] is as routine for a condemned prisoner to seek clemency.., as it is for him or her to
seek appellate review." Id. at 896.
90. Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 140.
91. Id. at 141.
92. Id. As of 1991, twenty-nine states placed the clemency power in the governor alone,
although most states include a parole board which issues non-binding recommendations. Sixteen
states require the approval of the parole board before any action by the governor may be taken,
and five states employ an administrative panel appointed by the governor to make the entire
clemency decision. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 605.
93. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 605-06; see also J. L. Gilin, Executive Clemency
in Wisconsin, 42 J. CRIM. L., C imINoLooy & PoL Sc3. 755, 757-58 (1951) (describing variations
in the clemency practices of several Wisconsin governors).
94. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 606.
95. See Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANoE 255, 259-61 (1990-91) [hereinafter Bedau, Decline of Executive
Clemency].
96. Id. at 260.
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Against this backdrop, the Court in Herrera decided to propose
executive clemency as a viable alternative97 to habeas review for free-
standing claims of actual innocence. 98 The Court stated that clemency
was "deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial
process has been exhausted." 99 The Court then went through a brief
history of clemency, noting that in England, clemency "provided the
principal avenue of relief for individuals convicted of criminal of-
fenses-most of which were capital-because there was no right of
appeal until 1907." 100 The Court also mentioned that "[t]oday, all 36
States that authorize capital punishment have constitutional or statu-
tory provisions for clemency,"' 101 and it concluded that executive clem-
ency "has provided the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system."'1 2 In
support of its holding, the Court argued that "history is replete with
examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in
the wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their inno-
cence.' 10 3 The Court then held that the "Texas clemency procedures
contain specific guidelines for pardons on the ground of innocence"
and found that Herrera had yet to apply for a clemency hearing. 0 4
Therefore, that avenue was still open to him.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor held that if "the safeguards
of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical mission, [the question of
actual innocence] may never require resolution at all."'01 5 Likewise,
Justice Scalia concurred, "With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to
face this embarrassing question [of actual innocence] again, since it is
97. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866 (1993). The Court stated: "This is not to say,
however, that petitioner is left without a forum to raise his actual innocence claim. For under
Texas law, petitioner may file a request for executive clemency." Id.
98. Id. at 869.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 866-67 (citing 1 L. RADzINOwIcZ, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 122
(1948)).
101. Id. at 867.
102. Id. at 868 (citing KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUB-
Lc INTEREST 131 (1989)).
103. Id. The Court cited a case study by Professor Edwin Borchard in which it was deter-
mined that out of sixty-five cases of newly discovered evidence of innocence, clemency was
granted in forty-seven of them and the remaining cases ended in judgments of acquittal after
new trials. Id. (citing E. BORCa RD, CONVIcriNO THE INNOCENT (1932)). The Court also
pointed to a recent study which found that clemency has been exercised frequently in capital
cases in which demonstrations of actual innocence have been made. Id. (citing M. RADELET ET
At, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 282-356 (1992)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opin-
ion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon."'1 6
The dissent argued fervently against the Court's reliance upon ex-
ecutive clemency as a viable alternative to the judicial process of
habeas review, stating, "[O]ne thing is certain: The possibility of exec-
utive clemency is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments .... The vindication of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution has never been made to turn on the
unreviewable discretion of an executive official or administrative tri-
bunal. ' 10 7 The dissent then argued that, "[i]f the exercise of a legal
right turns on 'an act of grace,' then we no longer live under a govern-
ment of laws."' 0 8 The dissent quoted West Virginia State Board of Ed-
ucation v. Barnette'°9 for the proposition that the "very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts." 110
There are at least three grounds upon which clemency may prop-
erly be based. First, clemency may be a "mercy-based""' process that
has no real relation to the formal judicial system." 2 Second, clemency
may constitute a "justice-enhancing" process that is intrinsically re-
lated to the issue of fairness and the judicial process. 1 3 Third, clem-
106. Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent relied upon Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 416 (1986), in which the Court had explicitly rejected the argument that executive
clemency was adequate to vindicate the Eighth Amendment right not to be executed if one is
insane. The dissent also argued that executive clemency "exists in every case in which a defend-
ant challenges his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare possibil-
ity would make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless." Herrera, 113 S. Ct.
at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)).
108. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
110. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638).
111. The term "mercy" here does not necessarily denote the sympathetic emotion of pity;
rather, it refers to the use of clemency for any purpose unrelated to formal notions of justice.
112. Stephen Garvey has distinguished between "dessert-innocence" in which the court as-
sesses the defendant's moral dessert based upon notions of justice under the law, and "mercy-
innocence" in which arbitrary mercy is dispensed regardless of whether justice requires it. Gar-
vey, Death Innocence, supra note 20, at 246 n.90. Garvey claims that the clemency power falls
within the "mercy-innocence" category and is unrelated to notions of justice. Id.
113. Bedau classifies this "justice-enhancing" category into two separate categories: (1) a
"quasi-judicial" rationale, in which clemency is viewed as providing the opportunity for one final
review, much like an appellate hearing, and (2) a "purely retributive" rationale in which the
clemency power should only be used as a "check" upon the powers of the judiciary when retribu-
tive justice has not been fully achieved. Under this second subcategory, pardons are "duties of
justice, not supererogatory acts [like mercy]." See Bedau, Decline of Executive Clemency, supra
note 95, at 257-58. This second subcategory, defining clemency in terms of strict justice, seems
quite outlandish in light of the historical origin and uses of the clemency process as an extrajudi-
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ency may constitute an "entitlement" under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 4 Each of these views will be ex-
plored in more detail in the following sections.
A. Clemency as a "Mercy-Based" Process
The clemency process has historically been depicted as an act of
private mercy"15 that is unrelated to any formal notions of justice. The
main characteristic of the view of clemency as a "mercy-based pro-
cess" is that it is essentially arbitrary." 6 Though we might be able to
study the reasons behind the pardoning of sentences for the sake of
mercy, they would be as varied as the individual cases that have led to
death row convictions.
Mercy may be arbitrarily bestowed because of the particular
moral circumstances of the case. For instance, crimes committed out
of necessity, such as a mother who steals food for her children, can be
justified as a higher moral imperative that should trump strict adher-
ence to traditional legality.117 More recently, the "battered woman
syndrome" 1 8 has been the focus of executive clemency review, 1 9 es-
pecially in cases in which such a "moral" defense was not allowed to
be raised in the courts.120 Another case for the application of mercy
cial remedy having little relation to the notion of retribution. See Hugo A. Bedau, A Retributive
Theory of the Pardoning Power?, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 185 (1993) [hereinafter Bedau, Retributive
Theory] (arguing against a strict retributive theory). Thus, this Note will only consider the first
subcategory of the "quasi-judicial" rationale for clemency review and equates this view with the
"justice-enhancing" category. But see KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND
TH PUBIC INTEREST 89 (1989) (arguing that clemency should be based on dessert).
114. See Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 201 (1993) [hereinafter Kobil, Due Process].
115. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-61 (1833) (Marshall, J.).
116. Id.
117. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 630-31.
118. The "battered woman syndrome" refers to the defense raised by abused spouses that it
was necessary to kill their abusive husbands in order to prevent a reasonably certain, but non-
imminent, threat to life. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who
Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371, 391 (1993).
119. For instance, in December 1990, Governor Richard F. Celeste of Ohio granted clem-
ency to twenty-six women who had been convicted of killing or assaulting their batterers, and in
February 1991, Governor William D. Schaefer of Maryland commuted the prison terms of eight
women who had been similarly imprisoned. See Tamar Lewin, More States Study Clemency for
Women Who Killed Abusers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at A19. More recently, Illinois Gover-
nor Jim Edgar has granted clemency to six convicted women under the "battered spouse" ration-
ale since he came into office in 1991; four of these pardons occurred in 1994. See Cynthia G.
Bowman, Spouse Abuse: A Disparity of Power, Cm. TRiB., June 23, 1994, at 27; Julie Irwin and
Susan Kuczka, A Defense That Could Be Abused; Battered Woman Syndrome Isn't An Open-
Shut Case, Cn. TRIB., May 14, 1994, at 1.
120. In granting clemency to twenty-six female prisoners, Governor Celeste gave great
weight to the fact that these women had not had the opportunity to present evidence of either
battered woman syndrome or a history of abuse at their trials. Lewin, supra note 119, at A19.
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has been where the death row prisoner has shown signs of rehabilita-
tion during his long stay in prison, and the governor or parole board
decides that the convict no longer deserves to be executed. 121 Many
other reasons for the clemency decision can be imagined that play up
to the humane and moral side of the clemency-granting authority. 122
The personal preferences and characteristics of the governor or
other official within whose hands the clemency power rests may also
arbitrarily affect the outcome of the clemency process. In United
States v. Wilson, Chief Justice Marshall described the power to pardon
as "an act of grace" that is "private.' 23 It is this "private" aspect of
the clemency power that allows for the injection of personal prefer-
ence into the clemency process because no external explanation need
be made for the use of such power. Some governors approve of the
death penalty while others detest it as inhumane.124 The clemency
power may be utilized to express the governors' views on this issue by
either granting an excessive number of pardons125 or none at all.
Thus, personal preferences may arbitrarily be applied to death row
convicts in different states and during different terms of office in the
same state.
Political considerations also play an important role in the decision
to grant clemency, thus making the process more arbitrary than a po-
litically immune system of rules. It is no secret that governors, as
Such a rationale also implicates the "justice enhancing" view of clemency. See infra notes 147-48
and accompanying text.
121. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 168.
122. Id. at 159-77. Abramowitz and Paget point to thirteen different factors that may affect
the standards for clemency review: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) doubt as to guilt; (3) fairness
of the trial; (4) relative guilt and disparity of sentences; (5) geographical equalization of
sentences; (6) mitigating circumstances; (7) rehabilitation; (8) mental and physical condition of
the defendant; (9) dissents and inferences drawn from the courts; (10) recommendations of the
prosecution and the trial judge; (11) political pressure and publicity; (12) the clemency authori-
ties' views on capital punishment; and (13) the role of precedent.
123. 32 U.S. 150, 160-61 (1833).
124. The political battle between Oklahoma Governor David Walters and New York Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo to obtain jurisdiction over death row inmate Thomas Grasso exemplifies the
personal differences that exist between governors on the issue of the death penalty. Governor
Walters personally supports the death penalty and wishes to extradite Grasso from New York so
that Grasso could be executed in Oklahoma. However, Governor Cuomo, who is staunchly
opposed to the death penalty, is fighting to retain jurisdiction over Grasso so that Grasso can
serve a 20 year prison sentence in New York before being extradited to Oklahoma. Governor
Walters stated, "I can only assume ... that it's [Cuomo's] own personal belief or disbelief in
capital punishment that would cause him to interrupt our carrying out justice here in
Oklahoma." Morning Edition Show, (National Public Radio, Oct. 18, 1993), available in LEXIS,
News Library, CRTNWS File.
125. Governor Holmes of Oregon used his clemency powers to commute every single death
sentence to that of life imprisonment. His actions were upheld by the courts. See Eacret v.
Holmes, 333 P.2d 741 (Or. 1958).
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elected officials, are accountable to their constituents and must please
them if they desire to remain in office. 126 When public sentiment ve-
hemently shows support or hatred for a particular death row convict,
the political official in charge of the clemency process would be politi-
cally foolish to make a decision that did not comply with the public's
wishes. 127 This "rule by the mob" adds to the arbitrariness of the deci-
sion to grant clemency.
Another characteristic of the view of clemency as a "mercy-
based" process is the lack of a formal and systematic approach with
regard to the clemency process itself. As opposed to the judicial sys-
tem, clemency hearings are not bound by the legal rules of evidence or
civil procedure.' 28 For instance, with regard to the testimony it may
hear, the clemency board is not limited by the doctrine of hearsay. 29
Cross-examination of witnesses may also not be required, or even al-
lowed, in clemency hearings. In the judicial system, these rules and
processes ensure the reliability of the testimony and evidence
presented. 30 Additionally, unlike the results of a judicial hearing, the
results of a clemency hearing are unappealable131 so that any system-
atic review of decisions may not be imposed. This also enhances the
126. Even in Roman times, Pontius Pilate's pardon of Barabas rather than Jesus suggests that
Roman leaders used the clemency power to achieve political rather than moral ends. See Kobil,
Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 584. Moreover, in the Middle Ages, the King of England only
used the clemency power to endear himself to his constituents. See supra notes 87-88 and ac-
companying text.
127. Attorneys have described their role as defense counsel in a commutation proceeding as
that of an organizer and agitator of public opinion. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at
172. It is in this atmosphere of a political circus that politicians usually make the decision to
grant clemency. On the other hand, the prevalence of public support for the death penalty sug-
gests to clemency authorities that the safest course of action is to avoid the exercise of their
clemency powers. Thus, "[p]risoners scheduled to be executed shortly before election day are
particularly vulnerable to denials of clemency." Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the Struc-
ture of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE LJ. 389, 394 (1989).
128. See Bedau, Decline of Executive Clemency, supra note 95, at 257 ("Clemency deci-
sions-even in death penalty cases-are standardless in procedure, discretionary in exercise, and
unreviewable in result.").
129. Such lack of regard for evidentiary rules also applies to the judicial process at the admis-
sibility stage. See FED. R. Evm. 104(a) (1984 & Supp. 1994). However, in the judicial setting,
the evidence is later subjected to the scrutiny of the trier of fact who may weigh the conflicting
factors and either believe or disbelieve it. But a clemency hearing goes farther than this by
combining the admissibility and weight criteria into a single decision. The clemency board is
thus more liable to make an erroneous decision based on unreliable information.
130. The procedural requirements of cross-examination and the hearsay doctrine have been
extolled as a bulwark of our liberty because of their great impact on reliability and the truth-
finding process. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 403 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (holding that "confrontation and cross-examination of the declarant in open court are the
most trusted guarantors of the reliability that is the primary concern of the Confrontation
Clause."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (holding out cross-examination as the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
131. See Bedau, Decline of Executive Clemency, supra note 95, at 257.
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arbitrary nature of the clemency process as individual decisions may
not be corrected or criticized from one case to the next.
B. Clemency as a "Justice-Enhancing" Process
The Court in Herrera stated that executive clemency is the "fail-
safe" in our criminal justice system, and is "the historic remedy for
preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been ex-
hausted."'1 32 The Court thus implies that executive clemency enhances
the criminal justice system by repairing the injustices that have re-
sulted from the fallibility of the formal judicial process.133 There is
some historical basis for this view of clemency as a "justice-enhanc-
ing" process.134 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Pa-
pers, "The criminal code of every country partakes so much of
necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary
and cruel."' 135 Likewise in Wilson, Chief Justice Marshall held that the
power to pardon is a "constituent part of the judicial system."'1 36 In
fact, the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia 37 declined to hold that
the discretion inherent in clemency is unconstitutionally arbitrary, 38
and instead it determined that the imposition of capital punishment
without clemency "would be totally alien to our notions of criminal
justice."'1 39
According to this view, it would be incorrect to say that executive
clemency is completely removed from the issue of justice and fair-
ness. 140 The clemency power is used largely to make up for any gross
132. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866-68 (1993).
133. The Court admitted that "[i]t is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the
human beings who administer it, is fallible." Herrera 113 S. Ct. at 868.
134. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 178.
135. TuE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), in FEDERALISTS AND ANT1'rEDERAL-
isTs: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATFICATON OF THE CONSTI-rrroN 117 (John P. Kaminski &
Richard Leffler eds., 1989).
136. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-61 (1833).
137. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. Id. at 199; see also Leavy, supra note 88, at 890 n.5.
139. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
140. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81. In a recent study of commutation decisions, it
was found that out of seventy grants of clemency between 1973 and 1992, forty-one were for
purposes of "judicial expediency" while twenty-nine were classified as "justice enhancing."
Michael L. Radelet and Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases,
27 U. RIcH. L. REv. 289, 297 & tbl. 1 (1993). Of these "justice enhancing" commutations, five
were classified as "unqualified mercy"; nine concerned lingering doubt about the defendant's
guilt; seven involved the defendant's mental problems; five involved equity in sentencing; and
another five were categorized as "other reasons." Id. at 300 & tbl. 2.
However, at least one scholar argues that clemency may never transcend its "mercy-based"
role to achieve justice. "An exercise of clemency is an expression of mercy, an act of grace, an
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errors that have occurred in the criminal justice system,141 rather than
simply being used in an arbitrary fashion unrelated to the notions of
justice.142 In fact, legislators who draft and revise criminal codes rely
upon the existence of executive clemency as a safeguard to their death
penalty legislation, and some analysts hypothesize that many jurors
and prosecutors believe that clemency may provide a remedy when
imposing the death penalty. 43 In addition, clemency is an integral
part of the capital punishment system in that the State may not take
an offender's life through judicial processes until the executive author-
ity has completed its clemency evaluation. 1'
Executive clemency, under the "justice-enhancing" view, ideally
serves two important functions in the imposition of capital punish-
ment that may not have adequately occurred in the formal judicial
process. First, clemency provides individualized sentencing on a case-
by-case basis that may take into account factors not capable of being
considered by the courts.' 45 For instance, where a mother has run
over her own child and is convicted of negligent homicide, a plea by
the mother that she has suffered enough by losing her own child may
prompt a governor or parole board to pardon her for her crime as a
logical extension of retributive justice.146 Additionally, clemency for
the "battered woman" who has killed her abusive spouse may not only
be considered a moral imperative, 47 but also an extension of the law
that provides a more "fair" result in such cases. 1'"
acknowledgment of the insufficiency of rules. It cannot be transformed into its opposite without
abandoning its distinctive claim to advance a radically different conception of justice." Peter H.
Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy
Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DuKc L.J. 163, 179 (1984). According to this view,
the arbitrary mercy which provides clemency with its identity and is its most powerful asset,
would be greatly diminished if clemency were constrained by any notions of traditional justice or
"fairness." Id.
141. The act of clemency requires no special justification to overcome the potential separa-
tion of powers in allowing the executive branch to override a judicial decision. Because clem-
ency lightens the burden placed on a convicted offender, such an act employs the popular liberal
political theory that absent any overriding reasons to the contrary, the government should al-
ways employ the least restrictive means to achieve its presumably valid objectives. See Bedau,
Retributive Theory, supra note 113, at 189.
142. According to the Radelet and Zsembik study, twenty-four out of the twenty-nine "jus-
tice enhancing" commutation decisions involved factors other than mere "unqualified mercy."
See Radelet and Zsembik, supra note 140, at 300.
143. Leavy, supra note 88, at 897.
144. Id. at 897-98.
145. Id. at 905.
146. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 633. Such an example of "poetic justice"
would make any further punishment of the defendant superfluous. Id.
147. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
148. Margaret Byrne of the Illinois Clemency Project for Battered Women recently asked
Illinois Governor Jim Edgar to grant clemency for twelve battered women convicted of first or
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Secondly, the clemency process protects against informational er-
ror by providing its own further investigation of the facts surrounding
the convicted criminal's case, including otherwise inadmissible miti-
gating factors. 149 Investigation by clemency officials might also in-
clude interviewing the jurors in the case, the convict's family and
friends, and the convict him or herself in order to get "a more com-
plete understanding of the defendant as a human being."'1 50 By ex-
panding these mechanisms for procedural review of errors in the
judicial process, the clemency process becomes intimately related to
the criminal justice system and enhances the procedural protections it
is designed to afford.
C. Clemency as an Entitlement Under the Due Process Clause
Some prisoners have argued that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides procedural protections in the form
of an entitlement' 5' to a "fair" clemency process. Such an argument
relies upon the "special role" that clemency plays in the judicial pro-
cess under the "justice enhancing" view.152 Under this view, if clem-
ency is part of the formal justice system, then it must be able to
provide "fair" procedures by which to govern that process. 53 For in-
stance, in McGee v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles,54
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a death row inmate had a
right to compel the Board of Pardons and Paroles to hold a hearing on
the commutation of his death sentence. The Court reasoned that the
Board had "failed to comply with the minimal requirements of the
second degree murder charges. As her rationale, Byrne stated, "We believe the law was too
harsh because the abuse each of these women suffered was not adequately considered at trial, at
her plea or at sentencing." Julie Irwin, Pardons Sought For 12 Women Who Killed Alleged Abus-
ers, O1m. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1994, at 5; see supra notes 119-20. See also Linda L. Ammons, Discre-
tionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the
Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
149. See Leavy, supra note 88, at 904-05.
150. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 183-84.
151. Procedural due process has been employed to establish an entitlement to continued
government employment. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985);
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972). It has also been used to establish an entitlement to government disability benefits.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Moreover, when such benefits are termi-
nated, due process may require a hearing and explanation of the reasons for the decision. Id. at
333.
152. For a more thorough discussion of clemency's "special role" and the cases cited in this
section of the Note, see Kobil, Due Process, supra note 114.
153. Id. at 213-17.
154. 376 P.2d 779, 781 (Ariz. 1962) (en banc).
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law" under the mandatory language of the commutation statute.155
The Court also stated that "[t]he unlawful taking of a human life has
from time immemorial been considered immoral .... If it is to be
justified under the law, it must not be done with less formality than
the spirit and traditions of the law contemplate. ' 1
56
However, all of the cases subsequent to this decision have come
down against affording due process protection to clemency petition-
ers. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,5 7 the Fifth Circuit held that an un-
favorable clemency decision in a capital case did not "implicate any
interest protected by the Due Process Clause."' 58 Later, in Connecti-
cut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,159 the United States Supreme
Court held that a life inmate had no constitutional "liberty" interest or
entitlement in receiving commutation or requiring the Board of Par-
dons to provide him with a written statement of reasons for denying
such commutation. The Court reasoned that the commutation statute
provides "unfettered discretion" to the State Board of Pardons. 60
The Court also held that the mere frequency with which other prison-
ers' sentences were commuted did not create an expectation of an
entitlement.'
6 '
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit in Otey v. Hopkins, 62 distin-
guished Dumschat in a capital case 163 by stating that Dumschat "dealt
155. Id. The Arizona statute provided that "every prisoner confined upon an indeterminate
sentence, whose minimum term of sentence has expired, shall be given an opportunity to appear
and apply for... an absolute discharge." Id. at 780 (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-411).
While no specific procedure was required for such a commutation hearing, the statute also pro-
vided that the Board was authorized to create rules and regulations, id. (citing ARz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31-403), but none were on file at the time of the petitioner's appeal. Id.
156. Id. at 781.
157. 578 F.2d 582, 619 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
158. See also Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S.
1034 (1989) (relying upon Spinkellink to hold that due process protections do not apply to clem-
ency petitions in capital cases); Smith v. Snow, 722 F.2d 630, 632 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).
159. 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981).
160. Id
161. Id. at 465. "No matter how frequently a particular form of clemency has been granted,
the statistical probabilities standing alone generate no constitutional protections; a contrary con-
clusion would trivialize the Constitution." Id.
162. 972 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir. 1992).
163. Kobil cites three ways in which Dumschat can be distinguished in capital cases. First,
whereas the Court in Dumschat found it relevant to its decision that the state statute provided
"unfettered discretion" to the Board of Pardons, 452 U.S. at 466, it can be argued that Dumschat
does not control where the statute does "fetter" the discretion of.the pardon authority. Second,
the petitioner in Dumschat argued that he had an expectation of actually receiving clemency,
and thus, the Board of Pardons had to explain its reasons for denying it, 452 U.S. at 464; how-
ever, this arguably does not cover situations where the petitioner is only asking for "meaningful
consideration" of his clemency petition. Third, since Dumschat, the Court has changed its views
about due process and held that protectable interests are not only created by state laws, but also
by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution itself. See Kobil, Due Process, supra note
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with a very limited argument that there was an expectation of actually
receiving a commutation" whereas Otey's argument was based on the
expectation of receiving only a "meaningful commutation process."'164
Therefore, the court decided to stay Otey's execution until the facts of
Otey's claim were further developed and a potential evidentiary hear-
ing held. 165 Otey then brought a section 1983 claim against the Ne-
braska Attorney General claiming that his right to both substantive' 66
and procedural due process had been violated by the procedure used
by the Nebraska Board of Pardons. 67 But the Eighth Circuit held
that no procedural or substantive right existed to create a protected
interest in clemency because "[d]eprivation is lacking.' 68 The court
reasoned that the commutation statute did not constrain the discretion
of the Board of Pardons; 69 thus, "[l]ike the clemency statute at issue
in Dumschat, the Nebraska clemency statute also is standardless" and
was not deserving of due process protection. 70
Judge Gibson dissented from the holding, stating that Otey's right
to substantive due process had been deprived by the Attorney Gen-
eral's dual role as prosecutor and Board member.' 7' Judge Gibson
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Herrera that executive clem-
ency is the appropriate forum in which to raise claims of actual inno-
cence.' 72 Judge Gibson reasoned:
By relying on the existence of executive clemency to justify exclud-
ing certain kinds of claims from judicial scrutiny, the Court recog-
nized that clemency procedures are an important last step of an
114, at 206-07. Moreover, in a capital case, such an interest might be stronger because it involves
the prisoner's "life" interest in addition to "liberty." Id. at 207.
164. Otey's underlying argument was that his due process right to "meaningful considera-
tion" of his clemency petition was being denied to him because the Attorney General who had
convicted him sat on the Board of Pardons that heard and decided his clemency petition. Otey,
972 F.2d at 211.
165. Id. at 212.
166. Otey alleged that five of his fundamental rights were violated as a result of the Attorney
General's dual role as prosecutor and Pardon Board member. (1) right to life; (2) a fair deci-
sionmaker; (3) a majority vote; (4) a parole board recommendation; and (5) failure to follow the
Board of Pardon's policies. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994).
167. Id. at 636.
168. Id. at 637. The court also relied upon Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), and Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989), to arrive at its decision. Otey, 34 F.3d at 638.
169. Id. at 637 (quoting Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032, 1034 (1994)). The court also
noted that a "review of Nebraska's Constitution, statutes, and procedures reveals that no right
has been conferred upon Otey beyond the right to seek a commutation. He was afforded this
right." Id.
170. Id. at 637. The court concluded, "To agree with Otey would hardly be federalism at its
best." Id. at 638.
171. Id. at 639 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
172. ld. at 639 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868-69 (1993)).
[Vol. 70:1391
1995] DIFFUSION OF DUE PROCESS IN CASES OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 1413
effort to avoid execution. This newly recognized and emphasized
significance of the clemency process illuminates the constitutional
deficiencies in the clemency proceedings.
173
Judge Gibson also remarked that in light of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, he was "unpersuaded by the argument... that substan-
tive due process requires a liberty interest other than that found in the
due process clause itself."'
1 74
III. TmE GARY GRAHAM CASE
On October 28, 1981, the 182nd Judicial District Court in Harris
County, Texas, convicted Gary Graham of the offense of capital mur-
der, and punishment was assessed as death. 175 But before his sched-
uled execution date, 176 Graham filed a writ of habeas corpus to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 177 on four grounds, 178 two of which
involved claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evi-
dence. On April 27, 1993, in a per curiam order, the court, sitting en
banc, denied him relief on all four grounds. 1
79
However, Judge Maloney dissented in light of the Herrera deci-
sion and stated that Graham did have a valid allegation in his fourth
ground of actual innocence that should be examined more closely.'80
Judge Maloney found that additional facts needed to be developed
regarding Graham's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the af-
173. Id. The majority had raised Herrera in its opinion, but they merely dismissed it by
stating that, "Otey makes no such showing [of actual innocence]." Id. at 636.
174. Id. at 641 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812-13 (1994); Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05 (1992)).
175. Ex Parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 564, 564-65 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2431 (1993). The court convicted Graham of the 1981 murder and robbery of Bobby
Lambert outside a Houston grocery store. Graham confessed to ten other similar armed robber-
ies that occurred within a two-week period of Lambert's death, but he insisted that he was inno-
cent in the Lambert case. Graham was convicted based on the testimony of a single eyewitness.
No physical evidence existed to link him to the crime. Christy Hoppe, State Appeals Court Hears
Graham Bid For Hearing, Tim DAL.AS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 1993, at 27A.
176. The trial court scheduled Graham's execution to be carried out on or before sunrise,
April 29, 1993. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 565.
177. This is the highest criminal court in the state of Texas.
178. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 565. These four grounds were: (1) request for a stay of execu-
tion pending the outcome of Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993), in the United States
Supreme Court; (2) request that the court determine the trial court's reliance on Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989), and Ex pane Acosta, 672 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); grounds (3)
and (4) concerned constitutional protections against the execution of an "innocent person." Id.
Graham was attempting to present evidence from ten new witnesses that he said would prove his
innocence. See Hoppe, supra note 175, at 27A.
179. 853 S.W.2d at 565.
180. Id. (Maloney, J., dissenting).
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fidavits that were presented to show his actual innocence. 181 Judge
Baird also dissented on the basis that the court should decide whether
the admission of newly discovered evidence is a subject fit for the ex-
ercise of habeas powers in light of the fact that the Court of Criminal
Appeals is permitted to make "public policy" determinations on be-
half of the State.' 82
Graham filed a motion for reconsideration on the same four
grounds he had alleged in his habeas petition. 8 3 On July 5, 1993, on
its own motion, the court granted a thirty day stay of execution based
on Graham's first ground for relief, whether youth could be used as a
mitigating factor in capital sentencing.' 84 Judge Maloney concurred in
the result to stay the execution, but once again dissented on the
ground that further relief should be granted Graham in the form of a
new evidentiary hearing based upon Graham's actual innocence
claim.' 85 Relying upon the dissenting opinion in Herrera,86 Judge
Maloney explained that the proper threshold standard to be applied
to actual innocence claims should be "whether the newly discovered
evidence, if true, would create a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict
to the extent that it undermines our confidence in the verdict and that
it is probable that the verdict would be different."'187 Once this thresh-
old question is met, "due process demands the attention of a forum
for further consideration of the evidence."'
188
Judge Maloney then argued that the three mechanisms conceiva-
bly available under Texas law for addressing such a claim were all in-
adequate.189 A motion for new trial was not available more than 30
days after conviction.' 9° Newly discovered evidence was not cogniza-
ble in an application for habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.191 And most importantly, "the process for seeking executive
181. Id.
182. Id Judge Baird cited Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d 756,765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), for
the latter proposition. Judge Clinton also held, without opinion, that he would grant the stay.
Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 565.
183. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
184. Id The court decided to wait until the outcome of the United States Supreme Court
case, Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993). Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 566-67. However, the
court refused to consider the merits of Graham's second, third, and fourth grounds for reconsid-
eration, the latter two of which involved his actual innocence allegations. Id. at 566.
185. Id at 567 (Maloney, J., concurring).
186. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 882 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 567 (Maloney, J., concurring).
188. Id
189. Id. at 567-68.
190. Id at 567. See TEx. R. APP. P. 31 (West 1994).
191. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 567 (citing Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 105-06 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983)).
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clemency was inadequate for testing the credibility of newly discov-
ered evidence of innocence due to the lack of formal procedures con-
trolling its use."' 92 Judge Maloney also quoted the dissent in
Herrera,193 which had argued against using executive clemency as a
viable alternative to a judicial hearing of new evidence of actual inno-
cence. 194 He concluded that because a claim of actual innocence "ulti-
mately turns upon the credibility of witnesses and further
development of the facts, it needs to be evaluated in an adversary set-
ting before a judicial trier of fact and law.' 195 Judge Maloney stated
that even accepting the high threshold standard in Herrera, he be-
lieved that Graham had met such a standard and was entitled to a
hearing. 19
6
Judge Clinton also concurred in the result to stay the execution
and agreed with Judge Maloney that Graham's actual innocence
grounds for relief should be reconsidered. 197 He expressed the view
that the "Executive Department is constitutionally required to adopt
and follow rules that comport with due process and due course of
law."'198 He also stated that based upon the Supreme Court's opinion
in Herrera, the Court of Criminal Appeals had the "duty and responsi-
bility to assure that due process" was met in cases of actual
innocence. 199
On July 7, 1993, when the thirty day stay of execution had ex-
pired, the judge of the convicting trial court ordered that the sentence
of death be carried out before sunrise of August 17, 1993.200 Graham
requested an executive clemency hearing from the Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles, but was denied such a hearing.201 Graham sub-
sequently filed a civil suit on July 21, 1993, in the 200th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Travis County against the Texas Board of Pardons and
192. Id. at 567-68.
193. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 881-82 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 568-69.
195. Id. at 569.
196. Id. Judge Maloney provided a long list of evidence that made Graham's case for actual
innocence much stronger than that of Herrera so that he concluded that the "extraordinarily
high" threshold level of Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869, had been met. Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 568-69.
Thus, he argued, Graham was entitled to a new judicial evidentiary hearing on the merits of his
actual innocence claim, the results of which should be forwarded to the Criminal Court of Ap-
peals so that they could determine whether a new trial was merited. Id.
197. Id. at 570 (Clinton, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. State ex reL Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals of Texas, 860 S.W.2d 873,874 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (en banc).
201. Id.
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Paroles.20 2 On August 9, 1993, the civil court ordered a temporary
injunction upon Graham's execution on the basis that the Board in-
tended "to refuse to grant Plaintiff a due course of law hearing on his
post-conviction claim of innocence or to stay ... Plaintiff's execution,
pending a due course of law hearing, as required by the Texas Consti-
tution. ' 203 In response, the Attorney General of Texas appealed the
civil court's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Third District.20 4
On August 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals granted a temporary in-
junction prohibiting the State officials and their agents from executing
Graham until final disposition of the appeal.205
The District Attorney of Harris County and the Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas then turned back to the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals
for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus directed to the civil
court of appeals to stay the temporary injunction so that Graham's
execution could proceed as scheduled. 2°6 But the Criminal Court of
Appeals denied the Attorney General's petition without a written or-
der.20 7 Judge Miller concurred in the opinion, noting that his real con-
cern was to address whether Graham had a viable means by which to
raise his actual innocence claim.208 Judge Miller explained that the
Texas statute regarding the process by which to obtain executive clem-
ency was unclear and inadequate.20 9 In order to apply for a clemency
hearing, the statute requires one of two items:210 a written recommen-
202. Id. Jim Harrington, Gary Graham's lawyer, explained that because the clemency pro-
cess was a civil procedure that was spelled out in the state Constitution, a civil remedy was
appropriate to insure Graham's right to a hearing. Harrington also said that he had no choice
but to file a civil case because Texas law limits how new evidence in criminal cases can be
presented and because "[b]asic human justice requires" a parole board hearing in the face of the
newly discovered evidence of innocence. "And what does it bother the board to spend two or
three hours (holding a hearing) than to stain our hands with the blood of an innocent man?"
Harrington told the court. See Hoppe, supra note 175, at 27A.
203. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d at 874 (citing civil court decision granting Graham a




207. Id at 873.
208. Id. at 878 (Miller, J., concurring). Judge Miller cited Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853,
866-68 (1993), at length to establish that clemency was the only viable form of relief that re-
mained to ensure fundamental fairness in actual innocence claims. Third Court of Appeals, 860
S.W.2d at 875-76.
209. Id. at 876-77.
210. Title 37, § 143.2 of the Texas Administrative Code provides as follows:
[T]he [Board of Pardons and Paroles] will only consider applications for recommenda-
tion to the governor for full pardon upon receipt of:
(1) a written unanimous recommendation of the current trial officials of the court
of conviction; and/or
(2) a certified order or judgment of a court having jurisdiction accompanied by a
certified copy of the findings of fact (if any); and
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dation from the current trial officials of the convicting court or a certi-
fied order accompanied by findings of fact and affidavits from
witnesses "upon which the finding of innocence is based. ' '2n Judge
Miller asserted that the language "finding of innocence" suggests that
a hearing on the claim of actual innocence must have been held at
some time prior to the filing of the application for clemency. 212 Thus,
the real issue was one of due process.213 If Herrera requires clemency
to be the "fail-safe" for actual innocence claims, then a prisoner must
be able to at least apply for such clemency.214 However, Texas law did
not seem to provide a procedure by which a prior "finding of inno-
cence" could be established in order to meet the application require-
ments.215 Judge Miller concluded that the State had the burden of
proving that Graham had an adequate avenue open to him to obtain a
"finding of innocence" so that he could apply for clemency under the
Texas statutory scheme.
21 6
On November 9, 1993, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on its own
motion, reconsidered its earlier ruling and decided to grant the Attor-
ney General leave to petition for the mandamus order enjoining the
Civil Court of Appeals from proceeding.21 7 On April 20, 1994, the
court ruled in favor of the State in its mandamus action218 and en-
joined the Third Court of Appeals from staying Graham's execu-
(3) affidavits of witnesses upon which the finding of innocence is based.
TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 143.2 (1989).
211. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d at 876-77 n.3 (Miller, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 877.
213. Judge Miller posed the question as one of procedural due process, id., but refused to
answer the question "whether it is a violation of substantive due process to execute an innocent
person." Id at 877 n.6 (Miller, J., concurring).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 878.
217. State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 386,
386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). The basis for such reconsideration was the finding that
the civil Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction staying Graham's execution.
Id.
218. State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third District, 885 S.W.2d
389, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). The Court of Criminal Appeals found that because
the stay of a death row imnate's execution is a "criminal law matter," it had appropriate manda-
mus power under the Texas Constitution, TEx. CoNsT. art. V, § 5. Honorable Court of Appeals,
885 S.W.2d at 394. The court further found that "[a]ny order by another state court which pur-
ports to stay a scheduled execution circumvents our decision and disobeys our mandate." Id. at
395-96.
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tion.219 But the court went on to answer the State's contention that
Graham's only remedy now was through state habeas review.
220
In Ex parte Binder,221 the Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled
that a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discov-
ered evidence was not cognizable on state habeas review. The Gra-
ham court first established that state habeas will lie "only to review
jurisdictional defect[s] or denials of fundamental or constitutional
rights. ' 222 The court then stated, "[f]rom our reading of Herrera, we
understand six members of the Supreme Court to have recognized the
execution of an innocent person would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
223
The court therefore overruled Binder and held that state habeas was
an appropriate avenue for Graham's claim of actual innocence.
224
The court then adopted the threshold standard previously sug-
gested by Judge Maloney: "whether the newly discovered evidence, if
true, would create a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict to the ex-
tent that it undermines our confidence in the verdict and that it is
probable that the verdict would be different. '225 The court then
adopted Justice White's threshold standard from Herrera as the bur-
den of proof for deciding Graham's actual innocence claim on the
merits: "based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record
before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could find
219. Id. at 396. However, the court made clear that the mandamus was limited to the Third
Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to enjoin Graham's execution. The opinion does not preclude
Graham from addressing the issues raised by the Board of Pardons nor does it preclude Graham
from "continuing to seek civil review of the clemency process." Id at 396 n.11.
The writ of mandamus was made conditional in order to afford an opportunity to the Third
Court of Appeals to conform its actions prior to the issuance of the writ. Id. at 399. Relying
upon the Criminal Court of Appeal's opinion, the Third Court of Appeals voluntarily dissolved
its temporary injunction staying Graham's execution, but retained jurisdiction over Graham's
civil claim concerning the clemency process. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles v. Graham, 878
S.W.2d 684, 686 & n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). Because the jurisdictional concerns in the Graham
case were alleviated by this action, this Note will not discuss the various concurrences and dis-
sents which dealt with this issue.
220. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 396.
221. 660 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
222. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 397 (quoting Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d
189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).
223. Id (citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869, 875, 876 (1993)). The six members of
the Court to whom the Texas court referred were Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, white, Black-
mun, Stevens, and Souter. Id. Apparently, the court thought that Justice Rehnquist agreed with
Justices Scalia and Thomas that no due process right existed for claims of actual innocence.
224. Id. at 397-98.
225. Id at 398 (Maloney, J. concurring and dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Graham, 853
S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. Such a
view also comported with the dissent's threshold showing in Herrera of "probably actually inno-
cent." Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 882 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."226 The court concluded
that this threshold standard and burden of proof used on state habeas
review "will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 227
Judge Campbell concurred, stating:
Certainly, the execution of an innocent person would offend the
most basic principles, deeply rooted in our civilization, that the in-
nocent must not be punished .... Given the interests at stake and
the relatively slight cost to the government of litigating those few
claims that will meet the minimum threshold set by the Court today,
due process of law requires that a judicial forum be available for the
assertion of such claims.228
Moreover, Judge Campbell stressed that when the United States
Supreme Court in Herrera relied upon the Texas clemency procedure
as a "fail safe, ' 229 it did not realize that the decision in Binder ren-
dered such a procedure useless in claims of actual innocence. 230 Thus,
such a misunderstanding necessitated the instant decision in order to
correct the constitutional error in the clemency process. 231
Judge White dissented from the court's expansion of the state
habeas power and called it an "unnecessary and dangerous" rem-
edy.232 Judge White reasoned that because Herrera pointed to clem-
ency as the historic remedy for actual innocence claims,233 the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals should not "add a layer of protection for
Fourteenth Amendment claims between this state's executive clem-
ency procedures and the federal habeas system. '234 Judge White also
stated that, "this Court is certainly 'not beholden to the federal courts'
to review federal constitutional claims on collateral attack. '235 Fur-
ther, Judge White described the danger of the new state habeas being
used as a "crowbar to open the door to a state forum in our trial
226. Id. at 399 (citing Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring)). Judge Clinton's
dissent posited that such a burden would be impossible by definition to meet. Id. at 417. Ac-
cording to Judge Clinton, "any evidence sufficient to support a jury's verdict beyond a reason-
able doubt at trial will also be sufficient to support a rational jury's guilty verdict even after
adding the most compelling newly discovered evidence to the mix." Id. For further discussion of
this criticism, see infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
227. I& at 399.
228. Id. at 400 (Campbell, J., concurring).
229. 113 S. Ct. at 868.
230. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 400-01. See supra notes 214-16 and accom-
panying text.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 402 (White, J., dissenting).
233. 113 S. Ct. at 866.
234. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 401-02.
235. Id. at 403 (citing Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (Clin-
ton, J., concurring)).
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courts for every inmate to relitigate his conviction years after he or




Rather than resolving the question of actual innocence in capital
cases, the Supreme Court's decision in Herrera has resulted in a diffu-
sion of due process protections by resorting to alternative state fo-
rums. The Gary Graham case provides an excellent example of such
diffusion because it relies upon Herrera to extend due process protec-
tions to both executive clemency and state habeas review. This sec-
tion will analyze whether these alternative forums are appropriate for
review of actual innocence claims and consequently, whether due pro-
cess protections should be extended to these forums after Herrera.
But in order to perform this analysis, it is first necessary to determine
what minimal due process protections are due a prisoner on death row
who brings newly discovered evidence of actual innocence.
A. Minimal Due Process in Capital Cases of Actual Innocence
Upon a quick reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Her-
rera,237 one might come away with the impression that the Court com-
pletely rejected the idea that procedural or substantive due process
protections 238 attach to freestanding claims of actual innocence.239
The Court devoted a good portion of its opinion to the development
of executive clemency as an alternative to federal habeas review of
actual innocence claims.240 As a result of such judicial rhetoric, one
would think that the Court's holding would be that claims of actual
innocence should never be cognizable on federal habeas review under
236. Id.
237. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 856-70 (1993).
238. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process requires fairness, integrity, and
honor in the operation of the criminal justice system and in its treatment of citizens' cardinal
constitutional rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 467 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cali-
fornia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
239. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859-60 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963),
overruled in other respects by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992)) ("[T]he existence
merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for
relief on federal habeas corpus"); Id. at 860 ("[Flederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individu-
als are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact"); Id. at 861
("Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas
review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.").
240. Id. at 866-69.
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any circumstances. 241 Yet, Justice Rehnquist ended his opinion by as-
suming, for the sake of argument, that "in a capital case a truly per-
suasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim. '242 Moreover, such a demonstration of innocence would
"necessarily be extraordinarily high" in light of the state's interest in
finality of its convictions. 243
The only rational explanation for ending the opinion with such a
hypothetical is that some due process protection does attach to capital
claims of actual innocence. By admitting that the Court might accept
the claim on habeas review if no state avenue were open to process
it,2' 4 the Court is really saying that the due process concerns in cases
of actual innocence have not been dismissed entirely but have merely
been shifted to the states' executive clemency processes. The Court
makes this even clearer when it asserts executive clemency to be the
"'fail safe' in our criminal justice system. ' 245 Such language implies
that clemency serves as an integral part of achieving fairness in the
justice system.246 In order for this statement to be true, executive
clemency, and presumably other state forums, must provide the same
level of due process protections that federal habeas review of actual
innocence claims would provide.247
It is this inconsistency between the Court's rhetoric that no due
process rights attach to a claim of actual innocence and its final hold-
ing that reserved a judicial forum for "extraordinarily high" evidence
241. This was the holding of Justices Scalia and Thomas in their concurrence. Id. at 874-75.
242. Id. at 869.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 868.
246. Id. It could be argued that because the Court denied Herrera due process protections in
the federal habeas forum, id. at 860, the Court never intended to afford Herrera such due pro-
cess protections in the executive clemency forum either. But this analysis of Herrera would only
make sense if the Court had considered executive clemency an arbitrary, "mercy-based" process
undeserving of due process protections. By framing clemency as the "'fail safe' in our criminal
justice system," id. at 868, the Court explicitly relied upon clemency as a "justice-enhancing"
process, thus implicating due process concerns.
247. In order for the petitioner to have a chance to meet the "extraordinarily high" threshold
on federal habeas review, there must be no state avenue open to process such a claim. Id. at 869.
It is logical, then, to assume from this statement that whenever some state avenue is open to hear
the petitioner's claim, the minimal due process requirements have been met. In other words, if
the existence of executive clemency did not provide due process protections, there would be no
reason for the federal courts to allow the petitioner habeas review when no alternative state
avenue exists to hear the claim.
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of innocence248 that seems to have caused confusion among the lower
courts and the subsequent diffusion of due process in this area. By
implicitly admitting that due process does attach to a certain class of
actual innocence claims,249 it was logical for lower courts to assume
that the Supreme Court did not wish to abrogate such due process
protections even in the alternative forums of executive clemency or
state habeas review. In light of these reasons, our analysis concerning
the viability of alternative state forums to federal habeas review must
begin with the assumption that the same due process protections that
apply to federal habeas review should also apply to these state
forums.
2 5 0
But beyond the inconsistencies within Herrera itself, traditional
notions of fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment and punishment
under the Eighth Amendment seem to dictate in favor of applying due
process protections251 to death row inmates who challenge their con-
victions on the basis of actual innocence. Despite the Court's express
248. Id. The concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy furthered the notion
that due process protections still remain. O'Connor could not "disagree with the fundamental
legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution." Id. at 870.
However, O'Connor avoided entirely the impact of her statement when she noted, "[n]o matter
what the Court might say about claims of actual innocence today, petitioner could not obtain
relief." Id. at 871.
249. See id
250. For a discussion of the viability of these alternative forums as guarantors of due process,
see parts IV.B. and IV.C. infra.
251. Such protections seem to arise from concerns for procedural, rather than substantive,
due process. Substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
A claim of wrongful execution in a capital case of actual innocence would certainly seem to fall
on the extreme end of the "rational continuum which.., includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); see also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 879 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Execution of an
innocent person is the ultimate 'arbitrary imposition."').
However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend such fundamental due process
rights beyond those of privacy, family, and personal autonomy. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2806-07 (1992) (abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (distribu-
tion of contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (use of contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165 (1952) (invasive stomach
pumping); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing and education). On the
other hand, the Court has established a substantive due process right to minimal custodial stan-
dards to convicted inmates or mental patients while under State care. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987) (convicts); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (mental
patients). Such fundamental rights appear to be closer in kind to affording a prison inmate some
form of protection from arbitrary execution, but they deal more with the administration of the
prison or institution than with reviewing the prisoner's underlying conviction.
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rejection of such rationales,252 this holding has been subject to much
criticism by scholars 253 and judges254 alike for placing form over sub-
stance. By attempting to replace federal habeas review of actual inno-
cence claims with the alternative forum of executive clemency, the
Supreme Court is merely using clemency as a scapegoat2s5 for its pro-
cess-oriented death penalty jurisprudence, 256 which refuses to take
into account the fundamental problems of potentially executing an in-
nocent person.257 The Court justifies its decision in Herrera by argu-
252. The Court "refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed re-
quires a different standard of review on federal habeas corpus" under the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Moreover, the Court rejected Herrera's Four-
teenth Amendment due process claim on the basis that refusing to hear new evidence eight years
after a conviction does not "offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." li at 864-66. The Court relied upon
the historical background of federal and state motions for new trial, none of which allowed for
such a long-term relitigation of one's conviction. Id.
253. See e.g., Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21.
254. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. Garvey argues that the modern system of capital punishment diffuses and fragments the
power to decide who dies. Because the system is composed of multiple actors, no single actor
bears the burden of undivided power and responsibility. In the end, "nobody actually seems to
do the killing." Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE LJ. 187, 187 (1991) [here-
inafter Garvey, Politicizing]. The Supreme Court's suggestion of clemency as an alternative dis-
plays precisely this mode of reasoning. The Court is trying to absolve itself of any wrongdoing in
unduly restricting habeas review of actual innocence claims by suggesting another branch of
government which is an inadequate alternative. In this manner, the Court attempts to place the
blame upon the clemency authority because it made the final decision to allow the execution.
This sly avoidance of its own responsibility under the Constitution must be exposed for what it is:
an attempt to value efficiency over due process.
256. Chief Justice Rehnquist has used the goals of efficiency and finality in attempting to cut
off federal habeas review of state claims. Rehnquist contends that "the flaw in the present sys-
tem is not that capital sentences are set aside by federal courts, but that litigation ultimately
resolved in favor of the state literally takes years and years and years." Paul Marcotte, Rehn-
quis" Cut Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 23.
Eric Freedman interestingly notes that while at first glance it might seem that eliminating
the procedural bars to habeas review would produce extensive new opportunities for delay, "so-
ber second thought should suggest the contrary." See Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism,
and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposals For Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence
in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. OF L & SOC. CHANGE 315, 321 (1990-91). Presently,
Freedman explains, claims of innocence on federal habeas corpus are asserted on procedural
grounds that the Court considers "true" constitutional errors. Id. But this roundabout manner
of addressing actual innocence claims on habeas increases the procedural complexity and causes
more delay than the more direct proposal suggested by Freedman and in this Note. Id.; see also
Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21, at 822 ("[Tlhe Court has done what most
lawyers tend to do-it has tried to find procedural solutions for a substantive problem.").
257. The Court in Herrera cites studies which state that clemency hearings have provided
relief for many cases in which newly discovered evidence of actual innocence was brought up
after conviction. 113 S. Ct. at 868 (citing E. BORCHARD, CONVICING THE INNOCENT (1932) and
M. RADELET ET AL, IN SprrE OF INNOCENCE 282-356 (1992)). In response to a study cited by
the dissent that twenty-three innocent persons have been executed in the United States this
century despite the safeguards of clemency, id. at 876 (citing H. Bedau & M. Radelet, Miscar-
riages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987)), the Court noted that
scholars have taken issue with that study. Id. at 868 n.15 (citing Markman & Cassell, Protecting
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ing that due process protections no longer apply because the
petitioner "does not come before this Court as an innocent man. '25 8
The circular reasoning evinced in statements such as this fails to ac-
knowledge the possibility that factual exculpatory evidence may come
to light after the defendant's original trial,2 9 and values "legal inno-
cence" over actual innocence.
Capital punishment is unique because it is irrevocable once per-
formed.260 Therefore, it is incumbent upon a civilized society to make
judicial procedures for capital punishment fundamentally fair and
nonarbitrary. 261 But the Court's disposition in Herrera leaves the su-
perficial impression that claims of actual innocence are less meritori-
ous in the eyes of the Court than claims of "technical" or procedural
the Innocent. A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988)). The prob-
lem with relying upon such studies is that none of them are going to be completely accurate and
the issue of the fallibility of the clemency system will be avoided altogether by citing statistics for
and against that proposition. In fact, the Court in Herrera admitted that it did not "doubt that
clemency-like the criminal justice system itself-is fallible." Id.
258. Id. at 860, 864 n.6.
259. Cobb, supra note 127, at 402 n.72.
260. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualita-
tively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs
more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two.").
261. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439 (1989) (plurality opinion); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
305 ("Because of that qualitative difference [between death and a prison term], there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."); see also Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex
Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MrNN. L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1993) (citing Sawyer v. Whitley,
112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 255-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
The Court in Herrera responds to this line of cases by stating that "it is far from clear that a
second trial 10 years after the first trial would produce a more reliable result." 113 S. Ct. at 863.
This statement already assumes that the newly discovered evidence of innocence is not reliable
simply because it would be difficult for a federal court to make such a factual determination.
But federal courts perform such factual analyses daily when they review the judgments of state
courts. See Lay, supra, at 1047 ("Federal judges have the experience and capacity to adjudicate
federal constitutional claims without excessive examination of procedural barriers. Federal
judges can readily recognize frivolous claims .... It is time to simplify federal habeas proce-
dures."). Even the sufficiency of the evidence standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324
(1979), requires analysis of the underlying facts upon which the conviction is based. Moreover,
the Court never had a problem with federal courts making an actual innocence analysis when
such factual determinations constituted a "gateway" through which the habeas petitioner could
pass to reach his or her procedural claims. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493
(1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454
(1986).
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violations262 of the rights of an accused.263 Such a holding is most
hypocritical of the Court in light of the use of actual innocence excep-
tions to allow habeas review of procedural claims that would other-
wise have been barred by restrictive doctrines. 264 By reaching the
merits of a habeas petition otherwise procedurally defaulted through a
"colorable showing of factual innocence, ' 265 the Court has acknowl-
edged that in such cases, the interests of justice trump those of feder-
alism and finality. Thus, what relevant distinction can the Court make
to justify its decision in Herrera that a freestanding claim of actual
innocence does not also trump such state interests?
Even if such a distinction can be made between isolated claims of
actual innocence and those which serve as a "gateway" to avoid proce-
dural error,266 how can the Court in good conscience refuse to hear
such claims in light of the requirements of both the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments? The two major rationales for affording due pro-
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment are actual assurance of
fairness through a valid truth-seeking process and the creation of an
outward appearance that justice has been done.267 As will be seen in
262. See Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 21, at 818. Hoffman argues that:
nothing could be more disruptive of our federal system than the present world of fed-
eral habeas litigation in capital cases-a bizarre world in which state-court judgments
are stayed for years, even decades, while defendants argue procedural Eighth Amend-
ment issues unrelated to the factual correctness of their convictions and sentences, and
states' attorneys respond by raising technical habeas defenses similarly unrelated to the
merits of the case.
Id. at 834.
263. See J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism,"
The Burden for Defense Counsel And the Loss of Innocence, 61 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 291, 324
(1992).
264. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 880 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Bator most eloquently
explains the inconsistency of the Supreme Court's process-oriented habeas jurisprudence:
If a state prisoner claims that he confessed after he was interrogated for six hours, not
(as the state court found) for four, the law says he may relitigate the issue and, perhaps,
gain release as a consequence, even though the evidence of guilt may be overwhelming.
But if a defendant is convicted of murder and ten years later another person confesses
to the crime, so that we can be absolutely certain that the defendant was innocent all
the time, the law says that he must rely on executive clemency. Why? Why should we
pay so little attention to finality with respect to constitutional questions when, in gen-
eral, the law is so unbending with respect to other questions which, nevertheless, may
bear as crucially on justice as any constitutional issue in the case?
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963).
265. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
266. The Court does attempt to make the distinction that federal habeas review of state
convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of procedural constitutional violations occur-
ring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceeding. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860. How-
ever, such a tradition has arguably existed only because the issue of freestanding evidence of
actual innocence had never been directly addressed before Herrera.
267. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 241 (1980);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951).
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the next two sections,268 the Supreme Court's relinquishment of the
federal habeas power over actual innocence claims to alternative state
forums greatly impairs the reality as well as the appearance of fairness
in the eyes of the American public. In the next three sections, we
shall explore this diffusion of due process in the area of actual inno-
cence and decide upon the best solutions to remedy it.
B. From Federal Habeas Review to Executive Clemency
This section will first use the assumption established above269 that
the same due process protections that apply to federal habeas review
should also apply to executive clemency, to determine whether the
clemency process may constitute a viable alternative to federal habeas
review under any of its three underlying theories:270 (1) "mercy-
based" process; (2) "justice-enhancing" process; and (3) entitlement.
Next, it will decide whether, despite its deficiencies, executive clem-
ency should still constitute an entitlement in light of the decision in
Herrera.
The rationale behind the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of due
process protection rests upon the reality and appearance of "fair-
ness" 271 in the guilt-determining process.272 The view of clemency as a
"mercy-based" process is antithetical to this notion of fairness and due
process. Under this view, clemency is completely arbitrary. The deci-
sion-making process is based upon personal preferences, 273 political
268. See infra parts IV.B. and IV.C.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
270. See supra part II.
271. "Fairness" is the catch-phrase of the Supreme Court in evaluating due process viola-
tions. It is the central theme around which such constitutional claims are litigated. See, e.g.,
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that due process involves
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
272. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
273. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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pressures, 274 and lack of systematic rules275 and appellate review. 276
Because procedural fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment de-
pends upon set standards of treatment that guarantee a person's due
process rights,277 it is irrational to consider an arbitrary, "mercy-
based" clemency process to be the "'fail safe' in our criminal justice
system."278
The view of clemency as a "justice-enhancing" process promotes
more serious discussion concerning the propriety of executive clem-
ency as a viable alternative to federal habeas review of actual inno-
cence claims.279 Under this view, the clemency process is intricately
related to the issues of fairness inherent in the criminal justice sys-
tem.280 However, the practical question remains whether it is realistic
to see the executive clemency process as a truly workable enhance-
ment of the criminal justice system capable of ensuring the same due
process protections as in federal habeas review.
274. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. Many critics feel that clemency is simply
too vulnerable to the pressures of politics and majoritarian rule. See, e.g., Garvey, Death-Inno-
cence, supra note 20, at 264 n.177; Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 880 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The plight of innocent death row convicts is made more apparent by the following
statistic: In 1974, about one out of every four or five death row inmates had his or her sentence
commuted to life in prison. But in 1988, the frequency of commutations had dwindled to barely
one in forty, a reduction by a factor of ten. See Bedau, Decline of Executive Clemency, supra
note 95, at 266. These statistics may be the result of the high level of apparent public support for
capital punishment, and the proven willingness of gubernatorial candidates to use a rival's oppo-
sition to the death penalty as evidence of being "soft on crime." Id. at 268.
On the other hand, even publicity of one's innocence will not guarantee an executive par-
don. Gary Graham is one of the best examples of this. To date, Graham has not received clem-
ency despite his appearance on television talk shows, a clemency petition signed by 15,000
people, open support from twenty Texas bishops, and various celebrities including Harry Be-
lafonte, Ossie Davis, Danny Glover, Kenny Rogers and former first lady Rosalynn Carter. See
"Day One," Reasonable Doubt? (ABC television broadcast, May 16, 1993); Nightline (ABC tele-
vision broadcast, Aug. 16, 1993); UNrrED PRESS INT'L, Austin Judge Rejects Graham's Request,
Sept. 12, 1994 (all sources also available in LEXIS, News Library, CRTNWS file).
275. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2228 (1992) (impartial tribunal); California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (access to the prosecution's evidence); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 187 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (opportunity to cross-examine available
witnesses); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (notice
and opportunity to be heard).
278. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
279. The fact that clemency has traditionally been looked upon as merely a "mercy-based"
process should not preclude an extension of due process to clemency procedures in light of the
modern death penalty scheme. See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The Role of Executive
Clemency in Modern Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RicH. L. REv. 227, 233 (1993) (arguing that the
traditional role of mercy in commutation has little place in the modern death penalty structure);
Kobil, Due Process, supra note 114, at 203 (arguing for an extension of due process protections
to the clemency process in capital cases); Daniel Lim, Note, State Due Process Guarantees For
Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 47 (1994).
280. See supra part II.B.
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Proponents of the "justice-enhancing" view argue that clemency
provides additional procedural protections in death penalty cases281
by providing individualized sentencing and minimization of informa-
tional error that could not be afforded through the criminal justice
system. 22 One method of acquiring such additional information is the
investigative power of the clemency authority.283 However, in all too
many states, the investigation exists in name alone;284 it proceeds
barely beyond the point of compiling data which has already been
filed by other agencies. 285
This fact should come as no surprise when one considers that
even as a "justice-enhancing" process, clemency is subject to the polit-
ical influences upon the clemency authority. Lack of funding for in-
vestigations is the inevitable result of placing the clemency process on
the political agendas of state governors. Funding in the state political
arena is lobbied for by many factions and those politically accountable
will not want to use valuable resources for a process that they feel
only rarely provides a chance of acquittal. Former Governor of Ar-
kansas, Bill Clinton, once stated that the "appeals process, although
lengthy, provides many opportunities for the courts to review
sentences and that's where these decisions should be made."286 This
type of sentiment among governors that clemency is an extraneous
process,287 combined with the political pressures for funding in other
281. See Leavy, supra note 88, at 906. Part of Leavy's rationale for imposing due process
protection upon the clemency process is that the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
158, 199 n.50 (1976), stated in dicta that capital punishment without a clemency provision "would
be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice." Leavy seems to believe that this statement by
the Supreme Court gives clemency the "justice-enhancing" function necessary to regard it as a
fundamental part of the American criminal justice system. Leavy, supra note 88, at 906. Leavy's
argument becomes even stronger in light of Herrera's express reliance upon executive clemency
as the "fail safe in our criminal justice system." 113 S. CL at 866-68.
282. Leavy, supra note 88, at 905.
283. In almost every state some form of investigation precedes the substantive clemency con-
sideration. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 82, at 148. The investigation may involve inter-
viewing many different parties including the prosecutor, jurors, witnesses, and family members
of the convict, as well as seeking new evidence that would change the status of the prisoner's
case from its position at trial. Id at 149.
284. Id. at 183, 186.
285. Id. In many states, the clemency authority does not even conduct a field investigation
that includes interviewing those people most associated with the petitioner's conviction. Id.
286. Andrea Neal, Clemency Becoming Rare as Executions Increase, CoRRECTIONs DIG.,
July 8, 1987, at 2; see also Cobb, supra note 127, at 394 ("Clemency authorities repeatedly have
relied on the accuracy of the legal process afforded capital defendants to justify denials of
clemency.").
287. When courts instruct jurors to ignore mercy, sympathy, and sentiment in sentencing
others to die, and when governors rely exclusively on the judicial system in reviewing those
sentences, capital punishment truly becomes a bureaucracy of death, with internally-imposed
norms and without personal reflection. Cobb, supra note 127, at 404. Cobb suggests that the
legislature should insulate executive clemency from political pressures through some sort of stat-
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areas of the state's operations, make a thorough clemency investiga-
tion almost always a low priority. Thus, the additional investigative
process, of which proponents of the "justice-enhancing" view boast, is,
in all practical aspects, inadequate to truly advance any due process
protection not already afforded the convict through the formal judicial
system.2m Clemency is not a truly "justice-enhancing" process but
rather the result of an allocation of resources based upon political
pressures. Under this scenario, the clemency decision is controlled by
majoritarian representation2 9 and state officials will bow to the pub-
utory scheme. Id. at 406. But in light of the political accountability of elected officials, isolation
from political pressure would be practically impossible. Id.
288. To enhance this investigative process, as some scholars suggest, would also seem imprac-
ticable in light of the political pressures at work. See, e.g., Leavy, supra note 88, at 908-10; Kobil,
Mercy Strained, supra note 81, at 633-35. But Leavy argues that due process protection must be
afforded to clemency hearings. Leavy, supra, note 88, at 908-10. She suggests the following
changes: (1) ability of all actors involved in the clemency process to make a public comment
about the case; (2) publicity of all clemency decisions; (3) guaranteed assistance of counsel; (4)
petitioner's personal appearance before the decisionmaker; and (5) assistance by experts and
specialists. Id.
But all of Leavy's solutions involve issues which either have no bearing on the fairness of
the hearing or are too expensive for the State to implement effectively. Leavy's first two points
both relate to publicity which returns to the problem of the arbitrary nature of decisions based
upon public sentiment rather than truth or fairness. The appointed counsel suggested by the
third point is likewise of little relevance to any traditional notions of fairness. Because clemency
authorities are not bound by formal evidentiary rules, the lawyer's main purpose in a clemency
hearing would be to raise public outcry about the case. Leavy's fourth point about the petitioner
making a personal appearance would only enhance the "mercy" aspect of the petitioner's case
rather than any traditional notions of fairness or justice. Leavy's final point about assisting the
petitioner with experts and specialists would cost more money to the State than is available in
the foreseeable future. In addition, if such evidence would have made a difference, it should
have been presented in the trial or appellate stages of the case.
289. This scenario is opposed to that of the judicial process in which the court is largely
unassociated with political pressures. Of course, majoritarian pressures exist in the election of
state judges, but the pressure is more diffuse and indirect than in the case of the governor's
clemency review.
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lic's views on clemency 290 much like under the "mercy-based" view of
clemency.
291
Because of these flaws in the "mercy-based" and "justice-enhanc-
ing" views of clemency, it seems a noble but misguided purpose to
attempt to guarantee a constitutional "entitlement" to clemency.
292
The same inherent flaws of arbitrariness and political considerations
that bode against the feasibility of clemency as an alternative forum to
federal habeas review also mar the possibility that any due process
protections may be imposed under the rhetoric of an "entitlement." If
the only remaining forum to hear claims of actual innocence is that of
executive clemency, it is inevitable that an innocent victim will more
likely be executed because of the arbitrary decisionmaking and lack of
funding for a proper investigation. A due process right to a clemency
hearing cannot solve what the clemency hearing itself lacks: some re-
lation to the issue of fairness.293 Thus, it is incongruous to create a
constitutional entitlement to be placed into a forum which in practi-
cality cannot guarantee a fair result.
On the other hand, perhaps the holding in Herrera itself estab-
lishes an "entitlement" to due process in clemency. Despite the flaws
in the clemency process, Herrera expressly established clemency as the
290. There is ample commentary that politicians use a pro-death penalty stance to their own
political advantage by meeting the public's desire for a hard line against crime. For instance, at
the end of Bill Clinton's first term in office as Governor, he commuted a number of death
sentences. After being defeated for re-election in 1980, Clinton staged a comeback bid in 1982,
promising "not to commute so many sentences if... given another chance." Wendell Rawls, Jr.,
Arkansas Gubernatorial Candidates in Close Race, N.Y. Tmms, Oct. 28, 1982, at B10. As Presi-
dent of the United States, Clinton continued to remind the American public that he had carried
out the death penalty before and would impose a tough standard of justice upon criminals.
Linda Diebel, A Tougher, Meaner America: Bill Clinton Launches a Republican-Style Attack on
the People Middle America Fears, Tim TORONTO STAR, Jan. 27, 1994, at A21.
Likewise, California Governor Pete Wilson organized a two-day crime summit in a
Hollywood church to mobilize popular and political support for a "get-tough" attitude toward
criminals and to launch his own uphill campaign for re-election. In the opening event, a memo-
rial service to murder victims was held in which the chapel was decorated with photos of young
victims, and survivors tearfully praised Wilson for leading anti-crime efforts. Governor Wilson
has presided over two executions during his first term in office and is expected to speak poorly of
his opponent in the election, Kathleen Brown, who is personally opposed to capital punishment.
Dan Walters, Crime Raised to Top Billing, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 8, 1994, at A3.
291. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. Garvey notes that "when politics selects
the constitutional norms meant to confine the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment is drained
of its integrity as a constitutional principle." Garvey, Politicizing, supra note 255, at 205.
292. See supra part II.C.
293. The Supreme Court perhaps recognized clemency's lack of connection to the formal
justice system when it decided that Warren McCleskey should be executed despite his convincing
argument that he could not obtain an impartial clemency hearing based on threats by state offi-
cials against the Board of Pardons. See McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1281, 1282 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); Sawyer v. Whiftley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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alternative to federal habeas review in capital cases of actual inno-
cence.294 By relying on the existence of executive clemency to justify
excluding actual innocence claims from judicial scrutiny,295 the Court
emphasized the significance of the clemency process and illuminated
the constitutional deficiencies in clemency proceedings.296
But the question remains: what degree of due process should be
afforded to clemency review? Courts have generally refused to find
an "entitlement" under the Due Process Clause297 for a right to be
granted clemency,298 to receive a statement of reasons denying clem-
ency299 or to receive "meaningful consideration" of one's clemency
petition.30 However, Gary Graham's clemency claim can be distin-
guished from all of these cases because it only requests the right to
apply for clemency under Texas law.30' The Texas clemency statute
required a certified judgment or order of a court having jurisdiction as
to the "finding of innocence" before Graham could apply for a clem-
ency hearing.3°2 Because the Supreme Court in Herrera had virtually
cut off federal habeas review of actual innocence claims 30 3 and no
state habeas forum allowed for such a "finding of innocence, ' 30 4 Gra-
ham was precluded from even applying for clemency under the Texas
statute. In such a case, it was arguably appropriate for the Texas
294. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866-68 (1993).
295. In deferring to the power of clemency, the majority in Herrera relied on the "politically
flimsy prospects for executive intervention in the most inflammatory criminal prosecutions." See
Sullivan, supra note 263, at 323.
296. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, J., dissenting). For the
counterargument to this view, see Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
No. 94-138, 1994 WL 397194 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1995). In Milone, the Seventh Circuit held that "there
is no constitutional right to a clemency hearing" and cited to Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 867, as sup-
port for this proposition. 22 F.3d at 705. The court was presumably citing to the statement in
Herrera that, "[A]lthough the Constitution vests in the President a pardon power, it does not
require the States to enact a clemency mechanism." 113 S. Ct. at 867. But reliance upon such an
isolated statement seems erroneous in light of the very next sentence in Herrera that states, "Yet
since the British Colonies were founded, clemency has been available in America." Id. Thus, it
is still possible to argue that Herrera creates a new due process right to a clemency hearing.
297. See supra part II.C.
298. Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034
(1989); Smith v. Snow, 722 F.2d 630, 632 (11th Cir. 1983); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dum-
schat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 619 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
299. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466.
300. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994).
301. State ex. rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals of Texas, 860 S.W.2d 873, 876-77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (Miller, J. concurring). See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying
text.
302. TEX. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 37, § 143.2 (1995).
303. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
304. Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 105-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overruled by State ex
rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994).
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Court of Criminal Appeals to expand state habeas review of actual
innocence claims in order to allow Graham his right to file a clemency
petition 305 which might actually entitle him to some relief.
30 6
C. From Federal Habeas to State Habeas Review
The decision in the Graham case to expand state habeas review to
include freestanding claims of actual innocence in capital cases30 7 has
also contributed to the diffusion of due process in such cases. This
section will first analyze the appropriateness of state habeas as an al-
ternative forum to federal habeas review of capital claims of actual
innocence.308 Second, it will answer the question whether, despite any
deficiencies it might have, it could still be considered a viable alterna-
tive forum in light of the decision in Herrera.
There are at least two major problems in allowing state habeas to
replace federal habeas review as the primary guarantor of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
First, since the American Civil War, the federal courts have been the
primary guarantors of individual constitutional rights.309 This juris-
prudential scheme arose out of the civil rights statutes,310 passed after
305. State ex. rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389,
400-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Campbell, J. concurring). Even the Eighth Circuit in Otey v.
Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994), conceded that, "Otey had no state-created right other
than the right to ask for mercy." (emphasis added).
306. On September 12, 1994, Judge Pete Lowry, the civil judge in Graham's case, rejected
Graham's "entitlement" argument to a clemency hearing precisely because the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals had created an alternative venue for Graham's claim of actual innocence. Christy
Hoppe, Clemency Hearing Denied for Inmate Gary Graham Judge Cites New Venue for Present-
ing Evidence, Tim DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1994, at 24A. Judge Lowry stated, "Gary
Graham doesn't have the same argument this year that he had last year. Now there is a rem-
edy." Id. Such a judgment seems to recognize that Graham's receipt of a state judicial forum for
his newly discovered evidence was a better path to asserting his innocence than a right to clem-
ency could ever be.
307. Honorable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 398-99.
308. This section will not deal with the Graham court's rationale that state habeas be ex-
panded in order to assure due process in the executive clemency process. Id. at 400-01 (Camp-
bell, J., concurring). That analysis was already covered in the preceding section on clemency as
an "entitlement." See supra notes 301-306 and accompanying text. Rather, this section concerns
the majority opinion in the Graham case which held that state habeas review should be ex-
panded in order to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause in light of Herrera. Hon-
orable Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d at 397-99. As with executive clemency above, we are
operating under the assumption that state habeas must provide the same due process protections
as federal habeas review in order to be considered a viable alternative forum. See supra notes
248-50 and accompanying text.
309. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972).
310. An example of such a statute is section 1983. Originally written as section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, it is currently classified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
[Vol. 70:1391
1995] DIFFUSION OF DUE PROCESS IN CASES OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 1433
the Civil War,311 which offered a "uniquely federal remedy" against
incursions of individual rights under the claimed authority of state
law.312 In light of this historical fact, it would indeed be strange for
federal courts to relinquish their powers over capital claims of actual
innocence to the states. Such a peculiarity becomes even more strik-
ing when one considers that it was the state courts that originally con-
victed the prisoner for his or her crime, and would be more
predisposed to uphold that judgment on direct or collateral review
than would federal courts.313
The second problem in relying upon state habeas to replace fed-
eral habeas review in the area of actual innocence is the lack of uni-
formity among different states in providing such due process
protections. Though the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in the Gra-
ham case might have decided to expand its state habeas review to in-
clude claims of actual innocence, other state courts may not have such
power or may expressly choose not to employ it. One valid reason for
refusing to expand state habeas review is that it is the legislature's job
to do so, not the courts. Another reason is that the state court might
determine that the procedural protections currently in place on direct
or collateral state review are sufficient to meet the due process re-
quirements of the United States Constitution.314 This lack of uniform-
ity among various state courts regarding the expansion of state habeas
review resembles the arbitrary nature of the executive clemency sys-
tem,315 and it weighs against shifting due process protections of fed-
eral habeas to the alternative forum of state collateral review.
However, just as in the executive clemency context,316 the deci-
sion in Herrera, which makes it almost impossible for a state prisoner
311. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified July 9, 1868, and had much to do with this
change in American jurisprudence. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238-39 (citing the Fourteenth
Amendment as the "centerpiece" of the new law in the post-Civil War era).
312. Id Thus, Congress provided that federal courts should play a major role in providing a
check upon unwarranted state power.
313. Of course, such logic only rings true if one accepts the assumption that state courts are
not as competent or unbiased as federal courts to decide federal constitutional claims under their
concurrent jurisdiction.
314. See Kelli Hinson, Comment, Post-Conviction Determination of Innocence For Death
Row Inmates, 48 SMU L. REV. 231, 254-56 (1994) (arguing that in the Graham case, the costs in
finality, federalism, judicial resources and potential for abuse by defendants outweigh the small
risk that the system will allow an innocent individual to be executed and thus decides against an
expansion of the state habeas power).
315. See supra part II.A. If the United States Supreme Court attempted to solve this uni-
formity problem by forcing state courts to adopt an expanded habeas remedy, this would be
even more intrusive in terms of federal-state comity than merely preserving the issue in the
federal habeas forum.
316. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
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to bring a freestanding claim of actual innocence on federal habeas
review317 may actually endorse the expansion of the state habeas
power in this area. Despite its deficiencies, state habeas review ap-
pears to be a better forum for hearing capital cases of actual inno-
cence than the alternative of executive clemency posed by the Court
in Herrera.31 8 At least with state habeas review, the petitioner is enti-
tled to a judicial forum 319 for hearing his or her factual evidence of
actual innocence rather than an arbitrary, underfunded clemency sys-
tem.320 Thus, state habeas seems to be the lesser of the two evils in
terms of the due process present in alternative forums to federal
habeas review.
D. Back to the Federal Forum With a Clearer Threshold Standard?
The diffusion of due process protections in cases of actual inno-
cence from the federal courts to alternative state forums is problem-
atic. In addition to the reasons stated above for rejecting executive
clemency and state habeas review as primary insurers of due pro-
cess,321 there exists a more rudimentary problem: the United States
Supreme Court appears to have relinquished its essential role as the
ultimate arbiter of a federal question of constitutional dimensions,
322
namely, the execution of an innocent person.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist attempts in Herrera to
transfer due process protections over actual innocence claims to the
state clemency forum while preserving certain "extraordinarily high"
317. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
318. Id. at 866-68.
319. See Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1993) (en banc) (Maloney, J., concurring
and dissenting) ("[B]ecause such a claim ultimately turns upon the credibility of witnesses and
further development of the facts, it needs to be evaluated in an adversary setting before a judi-
cial trier of fact and law. It is only in this setting that credibility can be determined."). The
importance of providing some sort of judicial habeas review in death penalty cases can not be
more stressed. Federal district and circuit court judges were the most important restraint on the
number of executions during the seven years after 1984 when the uptrend in executions was
effectively halted. See Zimring, supra note 2, at 19.
320. See supra notes 271-78, 284-91 and accompanying text. See also note 306 supra.
321. See supra parts IV.B. and IV.C.
322. See Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1952). The Court stated:
We granted certiorari in this [habeas] case 'because of a serious claim that petitioner
had been deprived of his rights under the Federal Constitution.' This Court, alone, is
the final arbiter of such a claim, and our grant of certiorari should entitle petitioner to
the chance to have the matter resolved by this Court ....
Id. (internal citation omitted). Such an abdication of power would be allowable if the Supreme
Court had ruled that no constitutional protections whatsoever should attach to the execution of
an innocent person. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 874-75 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
However, the Court's opinion in Herrera does implicitly recognize such a constitutional interest
by retaining some level of judicial scrutiny for freestanding claims of actual innocence. Id. at
869. See supra text accompanying notes 237-47.
[Vol. 70:1391
1995] DIFFUSION OF DUE PROCESS IN CASES OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 1435
threshold claims for the Court's review.323 But this is an intellectually
dishonest approach. The Court rejects Justice Blackmun's dissenting
view that the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments produce a due pro-
cess violation;324 yet, it refuses to accept Justice Scalia's view that no
due process protections whatsoever attach to freestanding claims of
actual innocence.3 25 The question thus remains: on what basis could
the Court have retained some power of judicial review over actual
innocence claims if the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments do not
apply to such claims? The simple answer is that the Fourteenth and
Eighth Amendments do apply to such claims, as the dissent argued,
but the Court did not want to admit that fact for fear that it would
open the federal courts to a flood of frivolous litigation. Yet, this sub-
terfuge has only confused the lower courts about the practical implica-
tions for judging freestanding claims of actual innocence.
326
Justice Rehnquist is not wrong to take the middle ground in Her-
rera; the strong competing interests of federalism and individual rights
323. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866-69. See supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
324. Herrera, 114 S. Ct. at 864-66.
325. Id. at 869.
326. This confusion is further aggravated by the differing standards set out by the other Jus-
tices in Herrera. See, e.g., Blair v. Delo, 999 F.2d 1219, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993) ("While we question
whether Blair's claim survives Herrera, because of the differing views of the several Justices, we
cannot conclude without more detailed study that Blair's claim is 'frivolous and entirely without
merit' or that there is not a substantial question upon which relief might be granted."). Different
lower court rulings have employed the Court's "extraordinarily high" language, Spencer v. Mur-
ray, 5 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994); Payne v. Thompson, 853
F. Supp. 932, 937 (E.D. Va. 1994), Justice White's concurring standard, Williams v. Warden, State
Prison, No. CV 91 1342 S, 1994 WL 516554, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1994), and the
dissent's "probably actually innocent" standard. Drew v. Scott, 28 F.3d 460, 463 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 5 (1994); Enoch v. Gramley, 861 F. Supp. 718,730 (C.D. Ill. 1994). In Enoch,
the court explained:
Although the Court feels that the burden of proof should be higher, the use of this
relatively minimal standard comports with a majority of those justices who appear will-
ing to recognize this assumed claim [internal citation omitted]. As such, the Court
deems this the appropriate standard to be used until that time when the Supreme Court
explicitly recognizes a claim of actual innocence and explicitly sets forth its accompany-
ing burden of proof.
Id.
Some lower courts have merely compared the facts of Herrera to those of their own case
and concluded that the threshold standard had been met. See, eg., Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d
565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (Maloney, J., concurring and dissenting); Blair, 999
F.2d at 1221 (Heaney, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court appears to desire such
a factual comparison when it serves to dismiss a claim of actual innocence. In Delo v. Blair, 113
S. Ct. 2922, 2923 (1993), the Court vacated a stay of execution by the Eighth Circuit on the basis
that, "It is an abuse of discretion for a federal court to interfere with the orderly process of a
state's criminal justice system in a case raising claims that are for all relevant purposes indistin-
guishable from those we recently rejected in Herrera." Because the district court had stated that
the "facts in Herrera mirror those in the present case," the Supreme Court held that there was
no need for the Court of Appeals to proceed on the claim any further. Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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mandate such a compromise. But rather than rejecting the dissent's
due process concerns outright and creating a vague exception for
those claims meeting an "extraordinarily high" threshold,327 the Court
more properly should have concluded that due process concerns are
implicated and then proceeded to create a clearly delineated standard
that takes into account the competing interests at stake. Such a stan-
dard would reclaim the due process safeguards in actual innocence
cases to the federal judicial forum where they truly belong,328 and it
would also alleviate the confusion among lower courts concerning the
method by which to adjudicate freestanding claims of actual
innocence.
The Court need not admit any analytical error in the Herrera
opinion in order to create such a new standard; rather, it need only
define its vague "extraordinarily high" threshold in clearer terms.
329
This threshold standard must accommodate the competing state inter-
ests in finality330 and comity, yet be accessible enough to create the
reality and appearance of fairness.331 The opinions of the concurring
and dissenting Justices in Herrera do not seem to provide a workable
standard that may be used to define the "extraordinarily high" thresh-
old of the Court. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Herrera can be
327. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
328. Of course, such a standard must be balanced against the competing factors of finality
and federalism that weigh against reopening a fully and fairly litigated trial. As of 1991, habeas
petitions from state prisoners made up only five percent of the civil caseload of the federal
district courts. Lay, supra note 261, at 1043 & n.162 (citing 1991 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 190-91). In stark contrast to this relatively
low figure is the high success rate in capital habeas petitions-fifty to seventy percent. Id. at
1044 n.166. Thus, such a balance weighs in favor of allowing federal habeas review of capital
cases of actual innocence.
329. 113 S. Ct. at 869. In formulating such a clearly delineated standard, we must utilize
"[t]he Due Process Clause [which] sets the minimum standard of proof required in [a] particular
context[ ] based on consideration both of the respective interests of the State and individual and
of the risk of erroneous decisions." Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 n.1 (1993). The function
of a standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
330. The imperative of finality appears to be the real animating force behind the Court's
habeas revolution. See Garvey, Death-Innocence, supra note 20, at 259. Finality is valued be-
cause it brings with it a sense of repose. Id. at 260. However, as Garvey argues, the real virtue
of finality lies not simply in more and faster executions by leaving questionable convictions in
place, but rather in the repose it brings in the security that justice has properly been served. Id.
at 263-64. In other words, as long as there is some lingering doubt about a convict's guilt, true
finality cannot be achieved by merely imposing procedural bars to the hearing of such claims.
On the other hand, it is not clear that Garvey's conception of finality can be equated with the
State's interest which is more concerned with avoiding the additional expenditure of relitigating
a conviction.
331. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
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ruled out because it imposes no standard at all; rather, it attempts to
deny any claim of actual innocence whatsoever. 332
Similarly, the dissent's "probably actually innocent" standard 333
fails for three reasons. First, it would be anomalous to define the
Court's "extraordinarily high" standard in the dissent's own terms
when they were rejected by a majority of the Justices in Herrera. Sec-
ond, the state arguably has a greater interest in preventing the disrup-
tion of a final conviction that was achieved without procedural error
as opposed to one in which procedural error did play a part. Third, if
there is any merit to the Court's historical distinction between claims
of actual innocence accompanied by procedural error and those that
are freestanding, 334 it is rational to impose a higher threshold standard
for freestanding claims of actual innocence.
Justice White's concurring standard in Herrera, which states that
based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before
the convicting jury, "no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, '335 also proves to be inappropriate for
use in cases of actual innocence. Justice White borrowed this standard
from Jackson v. Virginia,3 36 which involved the determination of
whether the record evidence presented in the trial below was suffi-
cient to find a conviction "beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 337 However,
as Justice Rehnquist explained in Herrera, Jackson does not apply to
cases of newly discovered evidence because such an analysis goes be-
yond determining the sufficiency of the record evidence 338 and strays
into a balancing test between the old evidence of the trial and new
evidence acquired after trial. 339 Furthermore, as Judge Clinton
pointed out in the Graham case, such a burden would be impossible
by definition to meet because "any evidence sufficient to support a
332. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
334. See id. at 860 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), overruled in other
respects by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992)).
335. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 324 (1979)).
336. 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).
337. Id. at 318.
338. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
339. Of course, the Court could seek to redefine this standard in order to take into account
the fact that the newly discovered evidence may work to negate the old incriminating evidence
against the petitioner. However, this would necessitate a different application of the standard in
the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim under Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, and the context
of a claim of newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Such disparate application might
prove just as confusing as the current "extraordinarily high" standard and may not be worth-
while pursuing.
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jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt at trial will also be sufficient
to support a rational jury's guilty verdict even after adding the most
compelling newly discovered evidence to the mix."'340
Because none of the other articulated standards in Herrera val-
idly define the Court's "extraordinarily high" threshold standard, it is
necessary to develop a new standard which incorporates all of the in-
dividual and state interests at stake.341 Such a standard should be
whether, based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record
before the convicting jury, the petitioner can prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. This standard incorporates portions of various
other standards in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence but tailors them
to the specific inquiry of a freestanding claim of actual innocence.
The "clear and convincing evidence" threshold level is borrowed
from the Court's definition of actual innocence in Sawyer v.
Whitley.342 While Sawyer dealt with a claim of "actual innocence of
the death penalty" in the capital sentencing phase of a trial that was
accompanied by a claim of procedural error,343 Herrera involved a
claim of actual innocence from the underlying conviction that was not
accompanied by a claim of procedural error.3" Because the actual
innocence claim in Sawyer was accompanied by procedural error
while the claim in Herrera was not, one might assume that the thresh-
old standard should be higher in Herrera. Yet, balanced against the
equally or more important distinction between true claims of actual
340. State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389,
417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
341. Other possible standards include those adopted in the California and Florida state
courts. The California Supreme Court has held that "newly discovered evidence is a basis for
relief only if it undermines the prosecution's entire case." In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal.
1993) (en banc). The court explained that it was not sufficient that the evidence "might have
weakened the prosecution's case or presented a more difficult question for the judge or jury."
Id. Rather, the evidence must cast "fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the
proceedings." Id.
The Florida Supreme Court requires that, "in order to provide relief, the newly discovered
evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Jones
v. State, 591 So,2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). The court established this standard for writs of error
coram nobis and relied upon the fact that "this is the standard currently employed by the federal
courts." Id. Notably, even after the decision in Herrera, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals still
continues to use this standard on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d
1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373,
1384 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 479 (1994). But see Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 700
n.5 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, No. 94-138, 1994 WL 397194 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1995) (refusing to
believe that the "acquittal upon retrial" standard can survive Herrera).
342. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
343. Id.
344. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 859 (1993).
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innocence, which challenge the petitioner's underlying conviction (as
in Herrera), and those claims merely challenging the severity of a con-
cededly guilty defendant's sentence (as in Sawyer), freestanding
claims of actual innocence should be entitled to at least the same
"clear and convincing evidence" standard as in Sawyer. The Supreme
Court in Schiup v. Delo345 clearly favored claims of actual innocence
over those challenging a convict's sentence because they "pose less of
a threat to scarce judicial resources and to principles of finality and
comity" since they are asserted much less frequently.346 Moreover,
the Court held that the "overriding importance of this greater individ-
ual interest" in avoiding injustice in actual innocence claims merits the
imposition of a "less exacting standard" than one merely challenging
the convict's sentence. 347
The suggested standard also takes into account the Court's con-
cern that there should be a relatively higher threshold standard for
freestanding claims of actual innocence than for those accompanied
by procedural error.348 Here, the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard replaces the "more likely than not" formulation under the
Carrier "probably resulted" standard.349 Moreover, because the
"clear and convincing" standard has been used in a variety of other
contexts,350 including protecting particularly important individual in-
terests in various civil cases, 351 there should be existing case law to
345. No. 93-7901, 1995 WL 20524 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995).
346. Id. at *12.
347. Id. at *13. Of course, whether the reader accepts such a balance depends upon the
relative weight given one distinction over the other. But the great importance which the Court
in Schlup attaches to claims of actual innocence as the "quintessential miscarriage of justice," id.,
arguably weighs at least as much as the Court's interest in avoiding review of freestanding claims
of actual innocence. This holds especially true where the Court appears to concede that some
level of judicial scrutiny is appropriate for such claims. See supra notes 248-50 and accompany-
ing text.
348. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
349. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,495-96 (1986) (holding that a "fundamental miscar-
riage of justice exception" applies where the constitutional violation has "probably resulted" in a
mistaken conviction); Schlup, 1995 WL 20524, at *14 (defining the Carrier standard as requiring
the petitioner to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have con-
victed him in the light of the new evidence").
350. One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some
other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424
(1979). The standard is also used to establish the affirmative defense of insanity in a federal
criminal trial. See Legal Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. 1995); United
States v. Crow, 37 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68 (5th
Cir. 1993).
351. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-32 (1979) (civil commitment proceedings); Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960)
(denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943)
(denaturalization).
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guide the judge about the quantum of evidence needed to meet this
standard.
Furthermore, while the suggested standard draws upon Justice
White's sufficiency of the evidence standard in Herrera,352 it avoids
the problems inherent in using that standard in the context of newly
discovered evidence of actual innocence353 by substituting the phrase
"could have convicted" with "would have convicted." As the Court
explained in Schlup, by using the word "could," Jackson limits the in-
quiry to the power of the trier of fact to reach its conclusion; thus,
either the trier of fact has the power as a matter of law to convict or
he does not.354 On the other hand, use of the word "would" focuses
the inquiry on the likely behavior of the trier of fact, including any
credibility determinations which might have occurred at the original
trial.355 Thus, the term "would have convicted" makes the inquiry
more probabilistic and allows a weighing of the old and newly discov-
ered evidence rather than allowing the mere sufficiency of the evi-
dence below to be determinative of the petitioner's claim.
356
In addition to the standard suggested above, a useful caveat
would be that the newly discovered evidence "must have been un-
known by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or his counsel could not
have known them by the use of diligence. ' 357 By restricting newly
352. 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring).
353. See supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text.
354. Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-7901, 1995 WL 20524, at *15 (Jan. 23, 1995).
355. Id.
356. Id. Yet, deference to the original conviction is preserved by imposing the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard on review rather than some lower standard such as "more likely
than not" or "probably actually innocent."
357. Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991); see also Friendly, supra note 37, at 159
n.11 (requiring that consideration of the newly discovered evidence be limited to that evidence
"which could not have been presented in the exercise of due diligence").
But must the "lack of due diligence" by trial counsel rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim before a habeas petitioner may use such newly discovered
evidence? In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court held, "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential... [A] court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance." In fight of this increasing deference to lawyers' conduct and the
consequent difficulty in succeeding upon such Sixth Amendment claims, it appears that some
less stringent standard of "diligence" should be employed concerning claims of newly discovered
evidence of actual innocence. Such a high standard may also be questionable on the basis that
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim merely imposes yet another procedural barrier toward
reaching the merits of the petitioner's substantive argument.
The Strickland standard is also inappropriate in the actual innocence context because it
requires that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable pre-
cisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investiga-
tion." Id. at 690-91. In a system where the professional norm for court-appointed counsel means
very little investigation due to lack of time and financial resources, this standard is patently
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discovered evidence to its plain meaning, federal-state comity will be
preserved.35 8 But even if this suggested standard and caveat are not
used,3 59 the Supreme Court must clearly define its vague "extraordi-
narily high" threshold in some clear manner. By refusing to do so, the
Court perpetuates the diffusion of due process in actual innocence
claims to inappropriate forums and ultimately undermines the public's
faith in our criminal justice system.
360
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Herrera to restrict the scope of
federal habeas review for freestanding claims of actual innocence has
resulted in a diffusion of due process protections to inappropriate al-
ternative forums. Executive clemency does not deserve the constitu-
tional protection of the Fourteenth Amendment because it involves
arbitrary preferences that are irrelevant to the issue of fairness in the
guilt-determining process. Because of political pressures and the lack
of resources for an adequate investigation by the clemency authority,
the clemency process will never be able to ensure the same procedural
protections that traditional trial courts can. Moreover, because the
federal courts have historically been the primary guarantors of indi-
vidual constitutional rights and states exhibit a lack of uniformity in
unfair to a defendant who seeks to expose newly discovered evidence of his or her innocence at a
later date. But see Hinson, supra note 314, at 256-61 (arguing that ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims should replace freestanding claims of actual innocence altogether).
358. A federal court's intervention into the finality of a state conviction only upsets federal-
state comity when it is based upon evidence which could previously have been brought to a state
court's attention. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (establishing doctrine of pro-
cedural default). But where the evidence is actually acquired after the state judicial processes
have been exhausted, no such interests are implicated.
359. Another important factor to consider in determining which threshold standard is most
appropriate is that a higher standard will likely serve as the actual "burden of proof" at the
hearing. The various standards to be used at the hearing stage were not addressed in Herrera
and are beyond the scope of this Note. For an interesting suggestion concerning hearings in
cases of actual innocence, see Freedman, supra note 256.
360. As Hoffman notes:
The specter of the execution of an innocent person... should haunt both supporters
and opponents of capital punishment. For opponents, it is often one of the main rea-
sons to seek abolition of the death penalty. For supporters, it would be the single event
most likely to cause a dramatic shift in public opinion against the death penalty. It
could even lead to the abolition of capital punishment altogether.
Joseph L. Hoffman, Starting From Scratch. Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty
Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 161 (1992).
Bedau and Radelet also state that recent survey research indicates that fifteen percent of
those who oppose the death penalty cite as a rationale the possibility of wrongful conviction.
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and
Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161, 165 n.31 (1988) (citing Gallup Report, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3). Thus,
it is clear that the issue of execution of the innocent affects the hearts and minds of all Ameri-
cans, regardless of their political stance on the death penalty.
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terms of due process protections, state habeas also can not replace
federal habeas review as an appropriate forum for hearing newly dis-
covered evidence of actual innocence.
Thus, the Court in Herrera is wrong to suggest these forums as
alternatives to federal habeas review in capital cases of actual inno-
cence. Because the issue of "fairness" is so important to our societal
notions of justice, especially on the fundamental question of the guilt
or innocence of a death row inmate, we cannot allow the Supreme
Court to substitute an inferior process to replace its own system of
habeas review. The faulty assumption among lower courts that these
forums are constitutionally adequate must be rebutted so that atten-
tion can more productively be focused upon providing appropriate
federal judicial remedies.
The Supreme Court has imprisoned itself in a web of conflicting
habeas jurisprudence. The simplest solution is for the Court to clearly
define its "extraordinarily high" threshold standard for actual inno-
cence claims. If no change occurs in the near future and the confusion
over this most fundamental issue continues to plague the lower state
and federal courts, an innocent person may be executed. This would
be the worst possible violation of our Constitution and of the Ameri-
can public's faith in our criminal justice system to provide a fair forum
in determining a person's guilt or innocence.
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